Joined Cases C-682/18 and C-683/18 Peterson v. Google & Youtube And Elsevier v. Cyando (C.J.E.U.)

Since its inception, the internet has challenged many basic principles of international copyright law. While some key “digital copyright” issues have been addressed in multilateral treaties, one of the most vexing issues with the global digital network remains—the question of the responsibility of third-party intermediaries for copyright infringements by internet users.

LEGAL REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION OF RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN

The article deals with the development of international scientific and technical cooperation betweenRussia and Kazakhstan and its main actors. International scientific and technical relations are describedthrough the prism of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the two states through regionalinterstate associations, in particular the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The author pays specialattention to the issue of legal regulation of international scientific and technical regulation, the mainmechanism of which is bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. At the same time, one of the important forms of cooperation is the development of coordinated measures to harmonize the regulatoryframework of Russia and Kazakhstan in the field of science and technology.

The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations: A theory of treatymaking

States negotiate over the specific terms of multilateral treaties because those terms determine states’ willingness to ratify the treaty. In some cases, a state might decline to ratify a treaty it otherwise supports because specific terms are too far from those it prefers. States and inter-governmental organizations negotiating treaties would like to uncover the minimal terms needed to secure the ratification of key states, but under what circumstances will those states candidly reveal those terms? Using a spatial representation of the issues in a treaty negotiation, we use mechanism design to determine what information states will reveal in a treaty negotiation. We find that states are willing to reveal how they would like tradeoffs between different issues to be resolved but not the minimal terms they require for ratification. Further, negotiations cannot always separate types that need concessions to ratify from other types that would like concessions but would ratify the treaty even if they do not receive them. These findings provide insight into how treaty negotiations can succeed or fail, and they lay the theoretical groundwork for a new line of empirical research on how multilateral treaties are negotiated.

An analysis of stagnation in multilateral law-making – and why the law of the sea has transcended the stagnation trend

The article explores the current stagnation in multilateral law-making based on an analysis of recent treaty attempts across various subfields of international law. It further examines why the law of the sea has continued to evolve despite this trend. The article demonstrates that states still regularly seek multilateral treaties to address new challenges. While there is some evidence of general treaty saturation, it is the current inability of traditional great powers to negotiate new binding norms which is the most constraining factor on multilateral law-making. This in turn is related to deeper geopolitical shifts by which traditional great powers, notably the United States and its allies, have seen their relative influence decline. Until the current great power competition ends or settles into a new mode of international co-operation, new multilateral treaties with actual regulatory effect will rarely emerge. The law of the sea has avoided the current trend of stagnation for primarily three reasons (i) a global commitment to the basic tenets of the law of the sea; (ii) a legal framework that affords rights and obligations somewhat evenly disbursed, allowing less powerful states to use their collective leverage to advance multilateral negotiations, despite intermittent great power opposition; and (iii) the avoidance of entrenched multilateral forums where decisions are reached by consensus only.

Law on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Historical Development and Its Prospects

The application of rules on reservations under the Vienna Convention on Laws of Treaties (VCLT) has generated a debate to revisit the Vienna regime. The rules on reservations under the VCLT have helped attain the universality of human rights treaties but at the price of integrity. The beneficial aspect of reservations is the promotion of universal recognition of human rights treaties. However, they have shattered the uniform and practical application of the provisions of these treaties. The disappointment of the treaty monitoring bodies over the VCLT’s rules on reservations to human rights treaties has resulted in the demand for a separate set of rules on reservations drawn to them. The universality and integrity of these treaties have been at the forefront of the treaty bodies and scholars. In the current debate on rules on reservations, this research tracks down the historical development of the law on reservations to multilateral treaties. It highlights the unique features of the human rights treaties and examines the application of rules to determine the compatibility of reservations. The research suggests treaty bodies adopt a novel approach to maintain the balance between universality and their integrity. Received: 9 April 2021 / Accepted: 3 June 2021 / Published: 5 September 2021

Regional patterns of multilateral treaty cooperation: Is there a Latin American ‘commitment gap’?

Latin American states have long been active participants in multilateral treaty making. However, the rich history of Latin American legal activism contrasts with debates about the degree to which these states commit to international agreements. We probe the existence of this purported ‘commitment gap’ by analyzing the signing and ratification of multilateral treaties. Are Latin American states less likely to ratify agreements they have signed than states from other world regions? Using survival analysis of an original dataset on multilateral treaties deposited with the UN Secretary-General, we find no difference between Latin America and North America/Europe in terms of ratification. If a commitment gap exists, it appears to be more evident in other regions, particularly East Asia, Africa, and the Anglo-Caribbean. To the extent that there is a ‘commitment gap’ at the regional level in Latin America, it is unlikely to be due to country-level factors such as domestic institutions.