Relational Responsibility: Ethics and Power in Supervision

Author(s):  
Sheila McNamee ◽  
Julie Tilsen
2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 331-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Gjerris ◽  
C. Gamborg ◽  
H. Röcklinsberg ◽  
R. Anthony

2020 ◽  
pp. 75-106
Author(s):  
Linus Vanlaere ◽  
Roger Burggraeve

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emese Ilyes

This proposal is an attempt to intervene in psychology’s violent past and troubling present by calling for notions of “care-ful” practice, compelling us to recognize and celebrate the permeable, porous, and flexible boundaries between bodies and selves. With this heuristic of care, this article hopes to trouble the separation between rigor and relational responsibility, to trouble objectivism, to oust the illusion of cool rationality, and to offer an affective understanding of consent that refuses to deny sexuality in bodies oppressed with the label of intellectually disabled.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 97-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damini Saini ◽  
Sunita Singh Sengupta

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 304-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted Peters

AbstractIf space explorers discover a biosphere supporting life on an off-Earth body, should they treat that life as possessing intrinsic value? This is an ethical quandary leading to a further question: how do we ground a universal moral norm to which the astroethicist can appeal? This article closely analyses various forms of responsibility ethics and finds them weak because they commit the naturalistic fallacy – that is, they ask nature to definethe good. The good, however, is self-defining and not derivable from nature. Even so, a revised responsibility ethic could ground its universal norms on the fact that life and only life can experience and appreciate the good. Conclusion: living creatures possess intrinsic value both on Earth and elsewhere in the Universe.


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