An Auction-Bargaining Model for Initial Emission Permits

This article analyzes intimate partner violence (IPV) in a developing country context, namely, Turkey, which faces an enormous increase in femicide cases over the last decade. Analyzing a very rich nationwide representative survey on IPV, we show that it is not only the absolute status of women but also their relative status in terms of income and education that affects different types of domestic violence, ranging from emotional abuse to physical and sexual violence. Besides, factors related to marriage setting are found to have a significant role in the effect of women’s superior status on IPV. Overall, we provide evidence to support the relative resource theory and invalidate the intra-household bargaining model in the Turkish case.

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Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

Journal of Conflict Resolution ◽

10.1177/00220027211027309 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 002200272110273

Author(s):

Aseem Mahajan ◽

Reuben Kline ◽

Dustin Tingley

Keyword(s):

Climate Change ◽

Characteristic Feature ◽

Economic Loss ◽

Bargaining Model ◽

Intergovernmental Panel ◽

Climate Negotiations ◽

Collective Risk ◽

International Climate ◽

Alternating Offers ◽

International Climate Negotiations

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

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Product Processing Prioritization in Hybrid Flow Shop Systems Supported on Nash Bargaining Model and Simulation-Optimization

Expert Systems with Applications ◽

10.1016/j.eswa.2021.115066 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 115066

Author(s):

Hiva Malekpour ◽

Ashkan Hafezalkotob ◽

Kaveh Khalili-Damghani

Keyword(s):

Flow Shop ◽

Simulation Optimization ◽

Nash Bargaining ◽

Hybrid Flow Shop ◽

Bargaining Model ◽

Model And Simulation ◽

Flow Shop Systems

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Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

Decisions in Economics and Finance ◽

10.1007/s10203-021-00326-x ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Marco Guerrazzi

Keyword(s):

Optimal Control ◽

Continuous Time ◽

Bargaining Power ◽

Wage Bargaining ◽

Bargaining Model ◽

Speed Of Convergence ◽

Wage Setting ◽

Dynamic Version ◽

Efficient Bargaining ◽

Over Time

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.

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