1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Beere ◽  
Gerald Fuller ◽  
Lara Maurer ◽  
Michael Pica
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-87
Author(s):  
M. Burdick Smith

This essay argues that Thomas Middleton and William Rowley's The Changeling (1622) draws on debates about sense perception in the period to interrogate the effects of dramatic representation. After a brief overview of early modern perceptual theory, this essay demonstrates that the play's villain, De Flores, manipulates other characters’ perception through language. In fact, De Flores uses theatrical language to manipulate how other characters perceive their environment, indicating the theater's ability to manipulate audiences. By affecting how characters perceive, De Flores affects other characters’ ability to process and react to their environment, which impedes their judgment. The essay argues that much of The Changeling's dramatic action unfolds through a conflict between two models of perception—presentational and representational—that undergird much of the play's dramatic conflict. In the play, pervasive anxiety about judgment, particularly how perception affects judgment, is structured around the distinction between these two models of perception. Considering the play alongside representational and presentational models indicates how early modern dramatists engage with intellectual theories to consider how representation works and how spaces are experienced. In this way, the theater refracts and dramatizes theories about perception.


2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (5) ◽  
pp. 929-956 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Crandall ◽  
Owen Cox ◽  
Ryan Beasley ◽  
Mariya Omelicheva

We explore US covert forcible actions against democratic governments and their citizens and show that interdemocratic use of covert force is common and can be accommodated within the theory of democratic peace. Grounded in the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy, we argue that democracies are constrained by public perceptions of their legitimacy from overtly aggressing against other democratic states. When democracies desire to aggress against their democratic counterparts, they will do so covertly. We test the assumptions of the theory and its implication with (1) laboratory studies of the conflation of democracy with ally status and (2) historical analyses of covert militarized actions and prisoner detention, which show that US forcible actions, when carried out against democracies and their citizens, are carried out clandestinely.


2018 ◽  
pp. 259-282
Author(s):  
Michael G. Johnson ◽  
Robert G. Malgady
Keyword(s):  

2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myron L. Braunstein

The attempt to relate distinctions in perceptual theory to different physiological systems leads to numerous exceptions and inconsistencies. A more promising approach to the reconciliation of constructivist theory and direct perception is to recognize that perception does involve inference, as the constructivists insist, but that inference is a process in logic that does not require unconscious reasoning and need be no more thought-like than resonance.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence W. Barsalou

Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components – not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift,run) and introspection (e.g., compare,memory,happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.


2002 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 492-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manish Singh ◽  
Barton L. Anderson
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-208
Author(s):  
Jenefer Robinson
Keyword(s):  

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