Perceptual symbol systems

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence W. Barsalou

Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components – not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift,run) and introspection (e.g., compare,memory,happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 637-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence W. Barsalou

Various defenses of amodal symbol systems are addressed, including amodal symbols in sensory-motor areas, the causal theory of concepts, supramodal concepts, latent semantic analysis, and abstracted amodal symbols. Various aspects of perceptual symbol systems are clarified and developed, including perception, features, simulators, category structure, frames, analogy, introspection, situated action, and development. Particular attention is given to abstract concepts, language, and computational mechanisms.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 635-636
Author(s):  
Katja Wiemer-Hastings ◽  
Arthur C. Graesser

The meanings of abstract concepts depend on context. Perceptual symbol systems (PSS) provide a powerful framework for representing such context. Whereas a few expected difficulties for simulations are consistent with empirical findings, the theory does not clearly predict simulations of specific abstract concepts in a testable way and does not appear to distinguish abstract noun concepts (like truth) from their stem concepts (such as true).


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence W. Barsalou ◽  
Léo Dutriaux ◽  
Christoph Scheepers

From the perspective of the situated conceptualization framework, the primary purpose of concepts is for categorizing and integrating elements of situations to support goal-directed action (including communication and social interaction). To the extent that important situational elements are categorized and integrated properly, effective goal-directed action follows. Over time, frequent patterns of co-occurring concepts within situations become established in memory as situated conceptualizations, conditioning the conceptual system and producing habitual patterns of conceptual processing. As a consequence, individual concepts are most basically represented within patterns of concepts that become entrained with specific kinds of physical situations. In this framework, the concrete versus abstract distinction between concepts is no longer useful, with two other distinctions becoming important instead: (i) external versus internal situational elements, (ii) situational elements versus situational integrations. Whereas concepts for situational elements originate in distributed neural networks that provide continual feeds about components of situations, concepts for situational integrations originate in association areas that establish temporal co-occurrence relations between situational elements, both external and internal. We propose that studying concepts in the context of situated action is necessary for establishing complete accounts of them, and that continuing to study concepts in isolation is likely to provide relatively incomplete and distorted accounts. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond W. Gibbs ◽  
Eric A. Berg

We agree with Barsalou's claim about the importance of perceptual symbols in a theory of abstract concepts. Yet we maintain that the richness of many abstract concepts arises from the metaphorical mapping of recurring patterns of perceptual, embodied experience to provide essential structure to these abstract ideas.


2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. H. Desai ◽  
J. R. Binder ◽  
L. L. Conant ◽  
M. S. Seidenberg

2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Kiefer ◽  
Eun-Jin Sim ◽  
Sarah Liebich ◽  
Olaf Hauk ◽  
James Tanaka

Concepts are composed of features related to different sensory and motor modalities such as vision, sound, and action. It is a matter of controversy whether conceptual features are represented in sensory-motor areas reflecting the specific learning experience during acquisition. In order to address this issue, we assessed the plasticity of conceptual representations by training human participants with novel objects under different training conditions. These objects were assigned to categories such that for one class of categories, the overall shape was diagnostic for category membership, whereas for the other class, a detail feature affording a particular action was diagnostic. During training, participants were asked to either make an action pantomime toward the detail feature of the novel object or point to it. In a categorization task at test, we assessed the neural correlates of the acquired conceptual representations by measuring electrical brain activity. Here, we show that the same object is differentially processed depending on the sensory-motor interactions during knowledge acquisition. Only in the pantomime group did we find early activation in frontal motor regions and later activation in occipito-parietal visual-motor regions. In the pointing training group, these effects were absent. These results show that action information contributes to conceptual processing depending on the specific learning experience. In line with modality-specific theories of conceptual memory, our study suggests that conceptual representations are established by the learning-based formation of cell assemblies in sensory-motor areas.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 593-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Ostarek ◽  
Falk Huettig

Twenty years after Barsalou’s seminal perceptual-symbols article, embodied cognition, the notion that cognition involves simulations of sensory, motor, or affective states, has moved from an outlandish proposal to a mainstream position adopted by many researchers in the psychological and cognitive sciences (and neurosciences). Though it has generated productive work in the cognitive sciences as a whole, it has had a particularly strong impact on research into language comprehension. The view of a mental lexicon based on symbolic word representations, which are arbitrarily linked to sensory aspects of their referents, was generally accepted since the cognitive revolution in the 1950s. This has radically changed. Given the current status of embodiment as a main theory of cognition, it is somewhat surprising that a close look at the literature reveals that the debate about the nature of the processes involved in language comprehension is far from settled, and key questions remain unanswered. We present several suggestions for a productive way forward.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svetlana Anatolyevna Osokina

The purpose of the paper is to prove that for a child the system of abstract concepts grows from the “material work” with the language. Using the case study method to a particular child we prove that little children can use rather complicated abstract words without knowing the concepts of these words. Children may use such words in proper grammar forms and correct collocations but they can’t explain the meaning of the words or give wrong explanation. It makes us think that in language acquisition process the language knowledge system is being developed earlier than the conceptual system of words meaning but we must understand what language knowledge consists of in this case and what it actually is. Implications for future research include further study of language knowledge system as having its own value independently from concept system of knowledge. Keywords: language acquisition, infant speech, language knowledge system, case study.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rutvik H. Desai ◽  
Megan Reilly ◽  
Wessel van Dam

Abstract concepts play a central role in human behaviour and constitute a critical component of the human conceptual system. Here, we investigate the neural basis of four types of abstract concepts, examining their similarities and differences through neuroimaging meta-analyses. We examine numerical and emotional concepts, and two higher-order abstract processes, morality judgements and theory of mind. Three main findings emerge. First, representation of abstract concepts is more widespread than is often assumed. Second, representations of different types of abstract concepts differ in important respects. Each of the domains examined here was associated with some unique areas. Third, some areas were commonly activated across domains and included inferior parietal, posterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex. We interpret these regions in terms of their role in episodic recall, event representation and social–emotional processing. We suggest that different types of abstract concepts can be represented and grounded through differing contributions from event-based, interoceptive, introspective and sensory-motor representations. The results underscore the richness and diversity of abstract concepts, argue against single-mechanism accounts for representation of all types of abstract concepts and suggest mechanisms for their direct and indirect grounding. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.


Author(s):  
Edward J. Bartek

There is too much factual knowledge to grasp even a speck of the whole. This makes for an excessive diversity that lacks in coherent unity. With no coherency in the parts, there will be no coherent truth in the whole. Without coherent truth there is only a relative truth. Relative truth makes for contradiction from different viewpoints, perceptions, and perspectives. Contradictions deny a common definition and meaning of truth, morality, justice, and beauty. They also deny common standards, values, principles, and virtues. Uncommon values lead to personal and social conflict and confusion, to the blocking of learning in education, to the disintegration of social unity. To have common standards and values, that a global theory of knowledge requires, concrete factual knowledge should be unified by abstract concepts that are unified by abstruse principles that are unified by symbolic structures. Such principles ultimately derive from an ultimate unity and structure. This ultimate unity is the keystone that holds the whole systematic structure of knowledge together.


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