On Aggregating Probabilistic Evidence

Author(s):  
Sergei Artemov
1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 437-466
Author(s):  
Wei-min Dong ◽  
Wei-ling Chiang ◽  
Felix S. Wong

2017 ◽  
Vol 114 (40) ◽  
pp. 10618-10623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristian Buc Calderon ◽  
Myrtille Dewulf ◽  
Wim Gevers ◽  
Tom Verguts

Multistep decision making pervades daily life, but its underlying mechanisms remain obscure. We distinguish four prominent models of multistep decision making, namely serial stage, hierarchical evidence integration, hierarchical leaky competing accumulation (HLCA), and probabilistic evidence integration (PEI). To empirically disentangle these models, we design a two-step reward-based decision paradigm and implement it in a reaching task experiment. In a first step, participants choose between two potential upcoming choices, each associated with two rewards. In a second step, participants choose between the two rewards selected in the first step. Strikingly, as predicted by the HLCA and PEI models, the first-step decision dynamics were initially biased toward the choice representing the highest sum/mean before being redirected toward the choice representing the maximal reward (i.e., initial dip). Only HLCA and PEI predicted this initial dip, suggesting that first-step decision dynamics depend on additive integration of competing second-step choices. Our data suggest that potential future outcomes are progressively unraveled during multistep decision making.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 168-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonah B Gelbach

I provide a brief comment on Allen & Pardo’s “Relative plausibility and its critics”. I agree that their relative plausibility explanationism (RPE) provides an attractive positive description of fact finding in litigation. But unlike Allen & pardo, I see RPE as methodologically consistent with the leading conceptions of evidentiary probabilism, Bayesianism and likelihoodism. Thus, I argue, the best view of the relationship between the approaches is that RPE is a friendly amendment to–because it provides a positive foundation for–probabilism.


Author(s):  
Lirieka Meintjes-Van der Walt ◽  
Priviledge Dhliwayo

The sufficiency of DNA evidence alone, with regard to convicting accused persons, has been interrogated and challenged in criminal cases. The availability of offender databases and the increasing sophistication of crime scene recovery of evidence have resulted in a new type of prosecution in which the State's case focuses on match statistics to explain the significance of a match between the accused's DNA profile and the crime-scene evidence. A number of such cases have raised critical jurisprudential questions about the proper role of probabilistic evidence, and the misapprehension of match statistics by courts. This article, with reference to selected cases from specific jurisdictions, investigates the issue of DNA evidence as the exclusive basis for conviction and important factors such as primary, secondary and tertiary transfer, contamination, cold hits and match probability which can influence the reliability of basing a conviction on DNA evidence alone, are discussed.


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