What Is and What Is not Regulatory Arbitrage? A Review and Syntheses

Author(s):  
Magnus Willesson
Keyword(s):  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuliya S. Demyanyk ◽  
Elena Loutskina
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Catalin-Gabriel Stanescu ◽  
Camelia Bogdan

AbstractNon-judicial recovery of debts is now rampant in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The reason is two-fold. On the one hand, the significant number of defaults in the poorer areas of Europe makes the CEE region a very attractive market for debt-collection. On the other hand, the activity is almost entirely unregulated, especially regarding abusive debt collection practices. The CEE region still lacks mature, strong, and experienced supervisory agencies that could tackle borderline activities. This enables companies involved in debt collection to comply easily with the minimal legal provisions and to circumvent the actual purpose of the law, including through tax sheltering and money laundering. The main argument developed in the paper is that the debt collection system it is designed to maximize profits, minimize tax base and, potentially, can serve as money laundering mechanism. The system functions in a triadic relationship: the debt-seller (a credit institution), the debt-buyer (usually an investment company), and the debt-administrator (a debt-collection agency, either fully owned by, or under the control of the debt-buyer), where debt portfolios are purchased at huge discounts (varying between 90 and 95% of face value). By revealing the mechanism used by debt-collectors, the paper calls for legislative intervention to seal the gap and ensure adequate taxation of debt-collection activities. The nature of regulatory arbitrage involved relates both to tax law as well as to regulatory standards, such as licensing requirements. Debt buyers benefit from the EU passport rule, make high returns on their 'investments' and optimize their taxes on profits obtained. Debt administrators perform their activity at almost no liability and no tax payable to the state. This mechanism creates favorable premises for money laundering and financing of illegal activities, as the web of offshore companies behind the debt-buyer renders the verification of the origin of their investment money extremely difficult. Using Romania as a case study, the paper addresses not only the aforementioned practices and risks, but also the potential reasons behind the state's inability either to adopt adequate legislation, or to enforce it. In doing so, the paper employs empirical evidence regarding the activity of ten Romanian debt collection agencies and relevant case law thereof. The paper concludes with the authors' proposal for a potential solution, which can be extended beyond Romania.


Author(s):  
Pablo Iglesias-Rodríguez

AbstractThis article proposes that product intervention constitutes a form of residual lawmaking by ESMA that allows it to tackle aspects of investor protection not addressed by EU incomplete financial laws. Whilst product intervention may bring about certain advantages and may contribute to mitigating regulatory arbitrage problems, it constitutes a highly intrusive regulatory mechanism that raises important questions concerning: (a) ESMA’s rationale and motivations for its use; (b) its compliance with the EU constitutional framework; and (c) its adequacy for the regulation of complex financial products. This article addresses these questions through an analysis of the rationale and consequences of ESMA’s product intervention measures on binary options and contracts for differences of May 2018–July 2019, and of recent reforms of ESMA’s powers. It offers three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it contributes to the literature on administrative discretion and agencies’ rulemaking through an analysis of the political economy of ESMA’s deployment of product intervention powers and, also, of what this reveals about the relationships between ESMA and the EU Institutions, on the one side, and ESMA and National Competent Authorities, on the other. Second, it contributes to the literature on the constitutionality of EU agencies through an examination of the compliance of ESMA’s product intervention measures with EU constitutional law and requirements. Third, it examines whether product intervention constitutes an adequate mechanism to address problems pertaining to investor protection in complex financial products markets and, in doing so, it contributes to the scholarly discussion on complex financial products’ regulation.


Author(s):  
Jan Friedrich

AbstractThis paper focuses on the interplay between accounting standards and tax laws in the context of regulatory arbitrage by examining the development of synthetic leases especially in the USA. In a synthetic lease, the lease remains off balance sheet for financial reporting by the lessee, while depreciations and interest expenses can be deducted for tax purposes. Exploring the evolving structures of synthetic leases over the last 30 years, the paper demonstrates how financial engineers have been able to perpetually re-structure this sophisticated instrument to keep it off-balance sheet instrument notwithstanding regulatory changes. Specifically, it shows that the most recent revision of lease accounting standards in 2016 – that intended to mark the end of off-balance sheet leases under IFRS and US-GAAP – resulted in reviving the demand for synthetic leases as the tax benefits outweigh the structuring costs. Contributing to the debate on the shift towards international accounting convergence (including US-GAAP and IFRS), the paper argues that attempts to limit regulatory arbitrage may also consider the reciprocal linkages between accounting standards and tax laws. For instance, tax laws should be considered as a means to limit regulatory arbitrage in financial reporting.


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