Understanding Homophily and More-Becomes-More Through Adaptive Temporal-Causal Network Models

Author(s):  
Sven van den Beukel ◽  
Simon H. Goos ◽  
Jan Treur
1994 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 315-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Castillo ◽  
A. Cobo ◽  
J. M. Gutiérrez ◽  
A. Iglesias ◽  
H. Sagástegui

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noam D. Beckmann ◽  
Wei-Jye Lin ◽  
Minghui Wang ◽  
Ariella T. Cohain ◽  
Pei Wang ◽  
...  

AbstractThough discovered over 100 years ago, the molecular foundation of sporadic Alzheimer’s disease (AD) remains elusive. To elucidate its complex nature, we constructed multiscale causal network models on a large human AD multi-omics dataset, integrating clinical features of AD, DNA variation, and gene and protein expression into probabilistic causal models that enabled detection and prioritization of high-confidence key drivers of AD, including the top predicted key driver VGF. Overexpression of neuropeptide precursor VGF in 5xFAD mice partially rescued beta-amyloid-mediated memory impairment and neuropathology. Molecular validation of network predictions downstream of VGF was achieved, with significant enrichment for homologous genes identified as differentially expressed in 5xFAD brains overexpressing VGF versus controls. Our findings support a causal and/or protective role for VGF in AD pathogenesis and progression.One sentence summaryVGF protects against Alzheimer’s disease


Author(s):  
Alain Sewer ◽  
Florian Martin ◽  
Walter K. Schlage ◽  
Julia Hoeng ◽  
Manuel C. Peitsch

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna M. van Loo ◽  
Jan-Willem Romeijn

AbstractNetwork models block reductionism about psychiatric disorders only if models are interpreted in a realist manner – that is, taken to represent “what psychiatric disorders really are.” A flexible and more instrumentalist view of models is needed to improve our understanding of the heterogeneity and multifactorial character of psychiatric disorders.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Ross

AbstractUse of network models to identify causal structure typically blocks reduction across the sciences. Entanglement of mental processes with environmental and intentional relationships, as Borsboom et al. argue, makes reduction of psychology to neuroscience particularly implausible. However, in psychiatry, a mental disorder can involve no brain disorder at all, even when the former crucially depends on aspects of brain structure. Gambling addiction constitutes an example.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document