Alternating Offers Protocol Considering Fair Privacy for Multilateral Closed Negotiation

Author(s):  
Hiroyuki Shinohara ◽  
Katsuhide Fujita
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110273
Author(s):  
Aseem Mahajan ◽  
Reuben Kline ◽  
Dustin Tingley

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.


2015 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 12-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Topi Miettinen ◽  
Andrés Perea
Keyword(s):  

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Etukudor ◽  
Benoit Couraud ◽  
Valentin Robu ◽  
Wolf-Gerrit Früh ◽  
David Flynn ◽  
...  

Reliable access to electricity is still a challenge in many developing countries. Indeed, rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries such as India still encounter frequent power outages. Local energy markets (LEMs) have emerged as a low-cost solution enabling prosumers with power supply systems such as solar PV to sell their surplus of energy to other members of the local community. This paper proposes a one-to-one automated negotiation framework for peer-to-peer (P2P) local trading of electricity. Our framework uses an autonomous agent model to capture the preferences of both an electricity seller (consumer) and buyer (small local generator or prosumer), in terms of price and electricity quantities to be traded in different periods throughout a day. We develop a bilateral negotiation framework based on the well-known Rubinstein alternating offers protocol, in which the quantity of electricity and the price for different periods are aggregated into daily packages and negotiated between the buyer and seller agent. The framework is then implemented experimentally, with buyers and sellers adopting different negotiation strategies based on negotiation concession algorithms, such as linear heuristic or Boulware. Results show that this framework and agents modelling allow prosumers to increase their revenue while providing electricity access to the community at low cost.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 485-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Shupp ◽  
John Cadigan ◽  
Pamela M. Schmitt ◽  
Kurtis J. Swope

Abstract This paper examines the behavior in multilateral bargaining experiments with alternating offers and asymmetric information. In all experiments, a single buyer has up to ten bargaining periods to purchase one unit of a good from each of two sellers. Treatments vary based on who makes the first offer (buyer or sellers), timing (consistent buyer-offer/sellers-demand or alternating), and information (buyer’s value and sellers’ costs are known or come from a uniform distribution). We find that actual bargaining outcomes are virtually identical when offers alternate, regardless of which player makes the first offer. We find that alternating offers reduce bargaining delay slightly compared to treatments in which one side or the other makes repeated take-it-or-leave-it offers. Finally, we find that incomplete information increases bargaining delay and the likelihood of failed agreements.


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