Developing Habits of Moral Reflection: Dewey, Moral Inquiry, and Practical Ethics

Author(s):  
Alan A. Preti
2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Doris
Keyword(s):  

Abstract In this commentary on May's Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, I argue that many of the interdisciplinary moral psychologists whom May terms “pessimists” are often considerably more optimistic about the prospects for progress in moral inquiry than he contends.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey N. Younggren
Keyword(s):  

Monatshefte ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-191
Author(s):  
Giovanna Pinna
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Gerald Gaus

This book lays out a vision for how we should theorize about justice in a diverse society. It shows how free and equal people, faced with intractable struggles and irreconcilable conflicts, might share a common moral life shaped by a just framework. The book argues that if we are to take diversity seriously and if moral inquiry is sincere about shaping the world, then the pursuit of idealized and perfect theories of justice—essentially, the entire production of theories of justice that has dominated political philosophy for the past forty years—needs to change. Drawing on recent work in social science and philosophy, the book points to an important paradox: only those in a heterogeneous society—with its various religious, moral, and political perspectives—have a reasonable hope of understanding what an ideally just society would be like. However, due to its very nature, this world could never be collectively devoted to any single ideal. The book defends the moral constitution of this pluralistic, open society, where the very clash and disagreement of ideals spurs all to better understand what their personal ideals of justice happen to be. Presenting an original framework for how we should think about morality, this book rigorously analyzes a theory of ideal justice more suitable for contemporary times.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2007 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-246
Author(s):  
Ingo Günzler ◽  
Karl Mertens ◽  
Pascal Delhom ◽  
Christian Grüny ◽  
Don E. Marietta Jr. ◽  
...  

Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Causerien 1948. Radiovorträge; Alessandro Delcò: Merleau-Ponty et l’expérience de la création. Du paradigme au schème; Christian Grüny: Zerstörte Erfahrung. Eine Phänomenologie des Schmerzes; Don E. Marietta Jr.: Beyond certainty. A phenomenological approach to moral reflection; Franz Gmainer-Pranzl: Heterotopie der Vernunft. Skizze einer Methodologie interkulturellen Philosophierens auf dem Hintergrund der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls


2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurie D Casteen ◽  
Elizabeth M Gibson ◽  
Patricia M Lampkin
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Virginia L. Warren

This chapter explores the concept of moral disability, identifying two types. The first type involves disabling conditions that distort one’s process of moral reflection. Examples include the incapacity to consider the long-term future, to feel empathy for others, and to be honest with oneself. A noteworthy example of self-deception is systematically denying one’s own—and humanity’s—vulnerability to the power of others, to accidents, and to having one’s well-being linked to that of others and the eco-system. Acknowledging vulnerability often requires a new sense of self. The second type includes incapacities directly resulting from ‘moral injury’—debilitating, self-inflicted harms when one violates a deeply held moral conviction, even if trying to remain true to another moral value. Examining moral disabilities highlights the moral importance of self-identity. More progress may be made on controversial issues if we discuss who we are, how we connect, and how we can heal.


Author(s):  
Adam Lerner

People engage in pure moral inquiry whenever they inquire into the moral features of some act, agent, or state of affairs without inquiring into the non-moral features of that act, agent, or state of affairs. The first section of this chapter argues that ordinary people act rationally when they engage in pure moral inquiry, and so any adequate view in metaethics ought to be able to explain this fact. The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation is to provide such an explanation. The remaining sections of the chapter argue that each of the standard views in metaethics has trouble providing such an explanation. A metaethical view can provide such an explanation only if it meets two constraints: it allows ordinary moral inquirers to know the essences of moral properties, and the essence of each moral property makes it rational to care for its own sake whether that property is instantiated.


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