Mechanism Design for Two-Opposite-Facility Location Games with Penalties on Distance

2018 ◽  
pp. 256-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xujin Chen ◽  
Xiaodong Hu ◽  
Xiaohua Jia ◽  
Minming Li ◽  
Zhongzheng Tang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Facility Location ◽  
Location Games

Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location

2019 ◽  
pp. 63-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Kyropoulou ◽  
Carmine Ventre ◽  
Xiaomeng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Facility Location

scholarly journals Non-Cooperative Facility Location Games: a Survey

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Félix Carvalho Rodrigues ◽  
Eduardo Xavier
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Location Games

Facility location games with optional preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 847 ◽  
pp. 185-197
Author(s):  
Zhihuai Chen ◽  
Ken C.K. Fong ◽  
Minming Li ◽  
Kai Wang ◽  
Hongning Yuan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Location Games

scholarly journals From Recommendation Systems to Facility Location Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1772-1779
Author(s):  
Omer Ben-Porat ◽  
Gregory Goren ◽  
Itay Rosenberg ◽  
Moshe Tennenholtz
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Facility Location ◽  
Recommendation Systems ◽  
Semantic Space ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Intervention Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Profile ◽  
Location Games ◽  
Facility Location Models ◽  
The One

Recommendation systems are extremely popular tools for matching users and contents. However, when content providers are strategic, the basic principle of matching users to the closest content, where both users and contents are modeled as points in some semantic space, may yield low social welfare. This is due to the fact that content providers are strategic and optimize their offered content to be recommended to as many users as possible. Motivated by modern applications, we propose the widely studied framework of facility location games to study recommendation systems with strategic content providers. Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a mediator to facility location models, in the pursuit of better social welfare. We aim at designing mediators that a) induce a game with high social welfare in equilibrium, and b) intervene as little as possible. In service of the latter, we introduce the notion of intervention cost, which quantifies how much damage a mediator may cause to the social welfare when an off-equilibrium profile is adopted. As a case study in high-welfare low-intervention mediator design, we consider the one-dimensional segment as the user domain. We propose a mediator that implements the socially optimal strategy profile as the unique equilibrium profile, and show a tight bound on its intervention cost. Ultimately, we consider some extensions, and highlight open questions for the general agenda.

scholarly journals Cooperative facility location games

2004 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel X. Goemans ◽  
Martin Skutella
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Location Games

scholarly journals Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hau Chan ◽  
Aris Filos-Ratsikas ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Minming Li ◽  
Chenhao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Facility Location ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Facility Location Problems ◽  
Social Objective ◽  
Comprehensive Survey ◽  
Strategic Agents ◽  
High Level

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decade, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to select a number of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting all the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.

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