scholarly journals Block Ciphers Implementations Provably Secure Against Second Order Side Channel Analysis

2008 ◽  
pp. 127-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthieu Rivain ◽  
Emmanuelle Dottax ◽  
Emmanuel Prouff
Keyword(s):  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Analysis ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Provably Secure

scholarly journals SITM: See-In-The-Middle Side-Channel Assisted Middle Round Differential Cryptanalysis on SPN Block Ciphers

2019 ◽  
pp. 95-122
Author(s):  
Shivam Bhasin ◽  
Jakub Breier ◽  
Xiaolu Hou ◽  
Dirmanto Jap ◽  
Romain Poussier ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Differential Cryptanalysis ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Secret Key ◽  
Side Channel Analysis ◽  
Cryptographic Algorithms ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Symmetric Block

Side-channel analysis constitutes a powerful attack vector against cryptographic implementations. Techniques such as power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis have been extensively studied to provide an efficient way to recover the secret key used in cryptographic algorithms. To protect against such attacks, countermeasure designers have developed protection methods, such as masking and hiding, to make the attacks harder. However, due to significant overheads, these protections are sometimes deployed only at the beginning and the end of encryption, which are the main targets for side-channel attacks.In this paper, we present a methodology for side-channel assisted differential cryptanalysis attack to target middle rounds of block cipher implementations. Such method presents a powerful attack vector against designs that normally only protect the beginning and end rounds of ciphers. We generalize the attack to SPN based ciphers and calculate the effort the attacker needs to recover the secret key. We provide experimental results on 8-bit and 32-bit microcontrollers. We provide case studies on state-of-the-art symmetric block ciphers, such as AES, SKINNY, and PRESENT. Furthermore, we show how to attack shuffling-protected implementations.

scholarly journals M&M: Masks and Macs against Physical Attacks

2018 ◽  
pp. 25-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren De Meyer ◽  
Victor Arribas ◽  
Svetla Nikova ◽  
Ventzislav Nikov ◽  
Vincent Rijmen
Keyword(s):  
Block Cipher ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Implementation Cost ◽  
Information Theoretic ◽  
Side Channel Analysis ◽  
Fault Resistance ◽  
Channel Analysis ◽  
Secure Implementation ◽  
Adversary Model ◽  
Provably Secure

Cryptographic implementations on embedded systems need to be protected against physical attacks. Today, this means that apart from incorporating countermeasures against side-channel analysis, implementations must also withstand fault attacks and combined attacks. Recent proposals in this area have shown that there is a big tradeoff between the implementation cost and the strength of the adversary model. In this work, we introduce a new combined countermeasure M&M that combines Masking with information-theoretic MAC tags and infective computation. It works in a stronger adversary model than the existing scheme ParTI, yet is a lot less costly to implement than the provably secure MPC-based scheme CAPA. We demonstrate M&M with a SCA- and DFA-secure implementation of the AES block cipher. We evaluate the side-channel leakage of the second-order secure design with a non-specific t-test and use simulation to validate the fault resistance.

scholarly journals Algebraic, AIDA/Cube and Side Channel Analysis of KATAN Family of Block Ciphers

2010 ◽  
pp. 176-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory V. Bard ◽  
Nicolas T. Courtois ◽  
Jorge Nakahara ◽  
Pouyan Sepehrdad ◽  
Bingsheng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Block Ciphers ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Side Channel Analysis ◽  
Channel Analysis
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