scholarly journals Trust Transitivity and Conditional Belief Reasoning

Author(s):  
Audun Jøsang ◽  
Tanja Ažderska ◽  
Stephen Marsh
2002 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 215-232
Author(s):  
Scott Sturgeon

Consider the frameS believes that—.Fill it with a conditional, sayIf you eat an Apple, you'll drink a Coke.what makes the result true? More generally, what facts are marked by instances ofS believes (A→C)?In a sense the answer is obious: beliefs are so marked. Yet that bromide leads directly to competing schools of thought. And the reason is simple.Common-sense thinks of belief two ways. Sometimes it sees it as a three-part affair. When so viewed either you believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment. This take on belief is coarse-grained. It says belief has three flavours: acceptance, rejection, neither. But it's not the only way common-sense thinks of belief. Sometimes it's more subtle: ‘How strong is your faith?’ can be apposite between believers. That signals an important fact. Ordinary practice also treats belief as a fine-grained affair. It speaks of levels of confidence. It admits degrees of belief. It contains a fine-grained take as well. There are two ways belief is seen in everyday life. One is coarse-grained. The other is fine-grained.


NeuroImage ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 1378-1384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Sommer ◽  
Katrin Döhnel ◽  
Beate Sodian ◽  
Jörg Meinhardt ◽  
Claudia Thoermer ◽  
...  

Synthese ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 191 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Hollebrandse ◽  
Angeliek van Hout ◽  
Petra Hendriks

Synthese ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 191 (5) ◽  
pp. 929-944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anika Fiebich
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
EMILIANO LORINI

Abstarct We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents’ cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory including the concepts of knowledge, belief, strong belief, conditional belief, desire, conditional desire, strong desire, and preference. We also present two extensions of the logic, one by the notion of choice and the other by dynamic operators for belief change and desire change, and we apply the former to the analysis of single-stage games under incomplete information. We provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the basic logic and for its two extensions.


Author(s):  
Te-Shun Chou ◽  
Kang K. Yen ◽  
Niki Pissinou ◽  
Kia Makki

2021 ◽  
pp. 62-92
Author(s):  
Franz Huber

This chapter first presents the static and dynamic rules of ranking theory. Then it shows how ranking theory solves the problem of iterated belief revisions.


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