Are the classic false belief tasks cursed? Young children are just as likely as older children to pass a false belief task when they are not required to overcome the curse of knowledge

The question of when children understand that others have minds that can represent or misrepresent reality (i.e., possess a ‘Theory of Mind’) is hotly debated. This understanding plays a fundamental role in social interaction (e.g., interpreting human behavior, communicating, empathizing). Most research on this topic has relied on false belief tasks such as the ‘Sally-Anne Task’, because researchers have argued that it is the strongest litmus test examining one’s understanding that the mind can misrepresent reality. Unfortunately, in addition to a variety of other cognitive demands this widely used measure also unnecessarily involves overcoming a bias that is especially pronounced in young children—the ‘curse of knowledge’ (the tendency to be biased by one’s knowledge when considering less-informed perspectives). Three- to 6-year-old’s (n = 230) false belief reasoning was examined across tasks that either did, or did not, require overcoming the curse of knowledge, revealing that when the curse of knowledge was removed three-year-olds were significantly better at inferring false beliefs, and as accurate as five- and six-year-olds. These findings reveal that the classic task is not specifically measuring false belief understanding. Instead, previously observed developmental changes in children’s performance could be attributed to the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge. Similarly, previously observed relationships between individual differences in false belief reasoning and a variety of social outcomes could instead be the result of individual differences in the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge, highlighting the need to re-evaluate how best to interpret large bodies of research on false belief reasoning and social-emotional functioning.

Are knowledge- and belief-reasoning automatic, and is this the right question?

Phillips et al. conclude that current evidence supports knowledge-, but not belief-reasoning as being automatic. We suggest four reasons why this is an oversimplified answer to a question that might not have a clear-cut answer: (1) knowledge and beliefs can be incompletely equated to perceptual states, (2) sensitivity to mental states does not necessitate representation, (3) automaticity is not a single categorical feature, and (4) how we represent others' minds is dependent on social context.

Developmental Trajectory of Theory-of-Mind Decline in Older Adults

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is critical to individual social competence and mental health across the lifespan (Frith, 2008). Though it is often discussed as one broad construct, ToM abilities can be viewed as following a developmental trajectory: from early emotion recognition and gaze following to more advanced inferences about others’ beliefs, perspectives, and intentions (Hutchins et al., 2012). Despite current literature suggesting that ToM abilities may be impaired in late adulthood, there is no consensus regarding whether ToM abilities are differentially affected by age. In this study, we examined younger adults (N=18, aged 19-30) and older adults (N=13, aged 58-76) on their ToM competence across three levels of ToM abilities: Early-ToM (e.g., recognizing a happy face), Basic-ToM (e.g., perspective-taking and false-belief reasoning), and Advanced-ToM (e.g., inferring second-order emotion and false belief). All participants completed a Theory-of-Mind Task Battery consisting of three subscales that assessed the three levels of ToM, where participants viewed vignettes and answered questions about the protagonists’ feelings and beliefs. Overall, younger adults outperformed older adults on the battery, F(1,29)=7.34, p=.011. However, a significant interaction between age and ToM levels (p=.010) revealed that Early and Advanced ToM (ps>.25) were not as affected by age as Basic ToM (p=.007). Older adults have difficulty in inferring others’ perspectives/beliefs while their attributions of emotion and higher-order false beliefs are relatively preserved compared to the younger adults. These findings provide important insights into the impact of age on various levels of ToM and could help inform early detection of ToM decline in normal aging.

Training Complements for Belief Reasoning in Developmental Language Disorder

Purpose Children with developmental language disorder (DLD) experience difficulties with an important Theory of Mind milestone, namely, false belief (FB) reasoning. Their FB success relates to mastery of a linguistic structure that is also challenging for them, namely, sentential complements (e.g., Claire says/thinks [that Santa Claus exists] ). Training typically developing (TD) children on complements has been shown to boost complements and, in turn, enhance FB, but such training has never been explored with children with DLD, which is the aim of the current study. Method Fifty French-speaking children followed a novel training program: 30 with DLD ( M age = 7;3) and 20 TD ( M age = 4;3). They engaged in iPad applications targeting complementation with verbs of communication (e.g., say, shout, answer ) during eight to 12 sessions lasting 30 min. Training commenced within 1–2 weeks of pretests and ceased 1–2 weeks before immediate posttests. After immediate posttests, the majority of children were available to be tested with follow-up tests after 4–6 weeks of no training. Results Findings revealed that both TD and DLD groups benefited from the training to significantly improve their complementation and FB scores. The gains achieved during immediate posttests were moreover maintained 6–8 weeks after training ceased, as revealed by preserved levels of performance during follow-up posttests. Conclusion This research thus suggests new avenues for therapeutic interventions for children with DLD, namely, the incorporation of a program directly training complements, which holds the promise of a double benefit, both for these structures and for Theory of Mind.