Mechanisms for Scheduling with Single-Bit Private Values

2012 ◽  
pp. 25-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Auletta ◽  
George Christodoulou ◽  
Paolo Penna
Keyword(s):  
Private Values

Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Private Values

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B. Wilson ◽  
Srihari Govindan
Keyword(s):  
Private Values ◽  
Existence Of Equilibria

The Simple Algebra of Surplus in Open, Private Values Auctions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Froeb ◽  
Vlad Mares ◽  
Steven Tschantz
Keyword(s):  
Simple Algebra ◽  
Private Values

scholarly journals Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

2011 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omer Biran ◽  
Françoise Forges
Keyword(s):  
Private Values ◽  
Independent Private Values

scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

Rent-seeking contests with private values and resale

Public Choice ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 138 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 409-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Sui
Keyword(s):  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Private Values

scholarly journals Private Values of Risk Tradeoffs at Superfund Sites: Housing Market Evidence on Learning about Risk

2000 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted Gayer ◽  
James T. Hamilton ◽  
W. Kip Viscusi
Keyword(s):  
Housing Market ◽  
Superfund Sites ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Risk Tradeoffs

scholarly journals Projection of Private Values in Auctions

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (10) ◽  
pp. 3256-3298
Author(s):  
Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch ◽  
Marco Pagnozzi ◽  
Antonio Rosato
Keyword(s):  
Allocative Efficiency ◽  
Reserve Price ◽  
English Auctions ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Optimal Reserve ◽  
Intensity Of Competition

We explore how taste projection—the tendency to overestimate how similar others’ tastes are to one’s own—affects bidding in auctions. In first-price auctions with private values, taste projection leads bidders to exaggerate the intensity of competition and, consequently, to overbid—irrespective of whether values are independent, affiliated, or (a)symmetric. Moreover, the optimal reserve price is lower than the rational benchmark, and decreasing in the extent of projection and the number of bidders. With an uncertain common-value component, projecting bidders draw distorted inferences about others’ information. This misinference is stronger in second-price and English auctions, reducing their allocative efficiency compared to first-price auctions. (JEL D11, D44, D82, D83)

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