Intensity Comparisons, the Borda Rule and Democratic Theory

The development of social choice theory over the past three decades has brought many new insights into democratic theory. Surprisingly, the theory of representation has gone almost untouched by social choice theorists. This article redresses this neglect and provides an axiomatic study of one means of implementing proportional representation.The distinguishing feature of proportional representation is its concern for the representativeness of deliberations as well as decisions. We define a representative in a way that is particularly attentive to this feature and then define a method of selecting representatives (a variant of the Borda rule) which selects a maximally representative body. We also prove that this method of selection meets four social choice axioms that are met by a number of other important social choice functions (including pairwise majority decision and the Borda rule).

Download Full-text

Democratic Theory and Causal Methodology in Comparative Politics

10.1017/cbo9781139198820 ◽

2013 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Mark I. Lichbach

Keyword(s):

Comparative Politics ◽

Democratic Theory

Download Full-text

Recognizing the Passion in Deliberation: Toward a More Democratic Theory of Deliberative Democracy

Hypatia ◽

10.2979/hyp.2007.22.4.81 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 22 (4) ◽

pp. 81-95 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Cheryl Hall

Keyword(s):

Deliberative Democracy ◽

Democratic Theory

Download Full-text

Between Specters of War and Visions of Peace

10.1093/oso/9780190903916.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Gerald M. Mara

Keyword(s):

Political Philosophy ◽

International Relations ◽

Political Theory ◽

Democratic Theory ◽

First Century ◽

Political Life ◽

Frames Of Reference ◽

War And Peace ◽

History Of ◽

Western Democracies

This book examines how ideas of war and peace have functioned as organizing frames of reference within the history of political theory. It interprets ten widely read figures in that history within five thematically focused chapters that pair (in order) Schmitt and Derrida, Aquinas and Machiavelli, Hobbes and Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, and Thucydides and Plato. The book’s substantive argument is that attempts to establish either war or peace as dominant intellectual perspectives obscure too much of political life. The book argues for a style of political theory committed more to questioning than to closure. It challenges two powerful currents in contemporary political philosophy: the verdict that premodern or metaphysical texts cannot speak to modern and postmodern societies, and the insistence that all forms of political theory be some form of democratic theory. What is offered instead is a nontraditional defense of the tradition and a democratic justification for moving beyond democratic theory. Though the book avoids any attempt to show the immediate relevance of these interpretations to current politics, its impetus stems very much from the current political circumstances. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century , a series of wars has eroded confidence in the progressively peaceful character of international relations; citizens of the Western democracies are being warned repeatedly about the threats posed within a dangerous world. In this turbulent context, democratic citizens must think more critically about the actions their governments undertake. The texts interpreted here are valuable resources for such critical thinking.

Download Full-text

Following Leaders

10.1093/oso/9780198823452.003.0011 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Robert E. Goodin ◽

Kai Spiekermann

Keyword(s):

Democratic Theory ◽

Opinion Leaders ◽

Independence Assumption ◽

Positive Correlation ◽

The Third ◽

Single Opinion

The question of leadership is connected to many central debates in democratic theory. In this chapter, the focus is on leadership in terms of beliefs, not desires. Opinion leaders’ influence undermines the Independence Assumption. The first section looks at single opinion leaders, who, if their influence is strong and their competence limited, reduce group competence, often severely. The second section considers multiple correlated opinion leaders. The effects depend on the negative or positive correlation between the opinion leaders, the number of voters following each, and the competence of leaders. Multiple uncorrelated opinion leaders are the topic of the third section. Their influence can be relatively benign if they are many and if they are reasonably competent. Finally, a great many ‘local’ opinion leaders, as envisaged by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, can offset the negative epistemic impact of a few ‘big’ opinion leaders.

Download Full-text

Democratic Theory and Socialism.Frank Cunningham

Ethics ◽

10.1086/293222 ◽

1990 ◽

Vol 100 (3) ◽

pp. 678-679

Author(s):

David Schweigkart

Keyword(s):

Democratic Theory

Download Full-text

Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies

Economic Theory ◽

10.1007/s00199-021-01353-w ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Christian Basteck

Keyword(s):

Monotonicity Property ◽

Scoring Rules ◽

The Other ◽

Approval Voting ◽

Property A ◽

Borda Rule ◽

Scoring Rule ◽

Direct Mechanism ◽

Social Choice Correspondence ◽

Choice Correspondence

AbstractWe characterize voting procedures according to the social choice correspondence they implement when voters cast ballots strategically, applying iteratively undominated strategies. In elections with three candidates, the Borda Rule is the unique positional scoring rule that satisfies unanimity (U) (i.e., elects a candidate whenever it is unanimously preferred) and is majoritarian after eliminating a worst candidate (MEW)(i.e., if there is a unanimously disliked candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected). In a larger class of rules, Approval Voting is characterized by a single axiom that implies both U and MEW but is weaker than Condorcet-consistency (CON)—it is the only direct mechanism scoring rule that is majoritarian after eliminating a Pareto-dominated candidate (MEPD)(i.e., if there is a Pareto-dominated candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected); among all finite scoring rules that satisfy MEPD, Approval Voting is the most decisive. However, it fails a desirable monotonicity property: a candidate that is elected for some preference profile, may lose the election once she gains further in popularity. In contrast, the Borda Rule is the unique direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies U, MEW and monotonicity (MON). There exists no direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies both MEPD and MON and no finite scoring rule satisfying CON.

Download Full-text