Concurrent Secure Computation with Optimal Query Complexity

Author(s):  
Ran Canetti ◽  
Vipul Goyal ◽  
Abhishek Jain
Author(s):  
Ivan Damgård ◽  
Jesper Buus Nielsen ◽  
Rafail Ostrovsky ◽  
Adi Rosén
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eli Ben-Sasson ◽  
Yohay Kaplan ◽  
Swastik Kopparty ◽  
Or Meir ◽  
Henning Stichtenoth

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Takashima ◽  
Daiki Miyahara ◽  
Takaaki Mizuki ◽  
Hideaki Sone

AbstractIn 1989, den Boer presented the first card-based protocol, called the “five-card trick,” that securely computes the AND function using a deck of physical cards via a series of actions such as shuffling and turning over cards. This protocol enables a couple to confirm their mutual love without revealing their individual feelings. During such a secure computation protocol, it is important to keep any information about the inputs secret. Almost all existing card-based protocols are secure under the assumption that all players participating in a protocol are semi-honest or covert, i.e., they do not deviate from the protocol if there is a chance that they will be caught when cheating. In this paper, we consider a more malicious attack in which a player as an active adversary can reveal cards illegally without any hesitation. Against such an actively revealing card attack, we define the t-secureness, meaning that no information about the inputs leaks even if at most t cards are revealed illegally. We then actually design t-secure AND protocols. Thus, our contribution is the construction of the first formal framework to handle actively revealing card attacks as well as their countermeasures.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Gur ◽  
Yang P. Liu ◽  
Ron D. Rothblum

AbstractInteractive proofs of proximity allow a sublinear-time verifier to check that a given input is close to the language, using a small amount of communication with a powerful (but untrusted) prover. In this work, we consider two natural minimally interactive variants of such proofs systems, in which the prover only sends a single message, referred to as the proof. The first variant, known as -proofs of Proximity (), is fully non-interactive, meaning that the proof is a function of the input only. The second variant, known as -proofs of Proximity (), allows the proof to additionally depend on the verifier's (entire) random string. The complexity of both s and s is the total number of bits that the verifier observes—namely, the sum of the proof length and query complexity. Our main result is an exponential separation between the power of s and s. Specifically, we exhibit an explicit and natural property $$\Pi$$ Π that admits an with complexity $$O(\log n)$$ O ( log n ) , whereas any for $$\Pi$$ Π has complexity $$\tilde{\Omega}(n^{1/4})$$ Ω ~ ( n 1 / 4 ) , where n denotes the length of the input in bits. Our lower bound also yields an alternate proof, which is more general and arguably much simpler, for a recent result of Fischer et al. (ITCS, 2014). Also, Aaronson (Quantum Information & Computation 2012) has shown a $$\Omega(n^{1/6})$$ Ω ( n 1 / 6 ) lower bound for the same property $$\Pi$$ Π .Lastly, we also consider the notion of oblivious proofs of proximity, in which the verifier's queries are oblivious to the proof. In this setting, we show that s can only be quadratically stronger than s. As an application of this result, we show an exponential separation between the power of public and private coin for oblivious interactive proofs of proximity.


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