Countervailing Buyer Power and Mobile Termination

Author(s):  
Jeffrey H. Rohlfs
2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-178
Author(s):  
Stuart V. Craig ◽  
Matthew Grennan ◽  
Ashley Swanson

2009 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörn Kruse

SummaryThe regulatory agencies found mobile termination to be monopolistic and adopted a policy of ex ante price regulation in recent years. This paper discusses two structural alternatives putting mobile termination under competitive pressure. The first one is the “receiving-party-pays-principle” where mobile termination is a part of the service bundle puchased by the mobile customer. The second is the proposal of a “mobile termination competition”. It turns mobile termination into a specific competitive market and looks like the optimal economic answer to the mobile termination problem. It works on the consumer as well as on the wholesale level.


Author(s):  
V. Pruzhansky

The article briefly outlines key economic principles that are used for merger appraisal in Europe and the US. We consider three most typical cases: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers. We explain the main positive and negative effects that typically arise in each case. We point that the analysis of structural factors (levels of industry concentration and market shares) and barriers to entry can serve only as a starting point of the merger appraisal process. Other indicators such as closeness of competition, countervailing buyer power and customer switching, counter-reactions of rivals, levels of profitability, cost savings are far more important for the analysis of merger effects on consumers and competition. In addition, we describe general economic principles with regards to merger remedies.


2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Westermeier

AbstractThis article deals with current developments concerning the regulation of telecommunication in Europe (e. g. Mobile Termination Rates, Roaming). It argues that current regulation is led by political aims and less by economic theory. National regulatory authorities should have more competences to consider national specifities concerning their decisions. The competences of the European Commission should be cut back. The idea of four or five pan-European companies dominating the European market should be discarded. Market consolidation should be the result of market competition and not promoted by the European Commission.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document