Variational analysis and mathematical economics 1: Subdifferential calculus and the second theorem of welfare economics

Author(s):  
A. D. Ioffe
Author(s):  
Gerard Debreu ◽  
Werner Hildenbrand

2012 ◽  
pp. 32-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Fleurbaey

The second part of the paper is devoted to the non-monetary indicators of social welfare. Various approaches to the study of subjective well-being and happiness are described. The author shows what problems a researcher would encounter trying to analyze welfare on the micro-level and to take account of the cognitive and affective aspects of the individuals assessment of their well-being, as well as the relevance of social relations. The author also shows to what extent the alternative approaches, particularly the analysis of functionings and capabilities advanced by A. Sen are compatible to the modern welfare economics and what prospects the latter has.


1969 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Kuenne

The burgeoning of abstract economic analysis since about 1950 makes the need for well-conceived consolidations and codifications at the textbook level peculiarly important. The task is a challenging one, demanding the attainment of a compromise between the "mathematics for economists" catalogues of techniques and the highly specialized and formalized "theorem-proof" sequences of the high-theory journals. It requires that skilful blend of the rigorous and the heuristic, the multidimensional and the diagrammatic, the logical and the intuitive, found in the teacher-born. Lancaster has succeeded admirably in finding the optimal mixture.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoinette Baujard
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Robert Sugden

Chapter 4 reviews ‘behavioural welfare economics’—the approach to normative analysis that is favoured by most behavioural economists. This approach assumes that people have context-independent ‘true’ or ‘latent’ preferences which, because of psychologically-induced errors, are not always revealed in actual choices. Behavioural welfare economics aims to reconstruct latent preferences by identifying and removing the effects of error on decisions, and to design policies to satisfy those preferences. Its implicit model of human agency is of an ‘inner rational agent’ that interacts with the world through an imperfect psychological ‘shell’. I argue that there is no satisfactory evidence to support this model, and no credible psychological foundation for it. Since the concept of true preference has no empirical content, the idea that such preferences can be reconstructed is a mirage. Normative economics needs to be more radical in giving up rationality assumptions.


1956 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diran Bodenhorn

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