Property Rights, Body Parts, and Reproduction

Author(s):  
David M. Vukadinovich ◽  
Susan L. Krinsky
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Justine Pila

This chapter surveys the current legal position concerning property in bodies and bodily materials. Of especial relevance in the current age of advanced genetic and other bio technologies, it looks beyond property in bodies and their materials ‘as such’ to consider also (a) the availability of rights of personal and intellectual property in objects incorporating or derived from them, and (b) the reliance on quasi-property rights of possession and consent to regulate the storage and use of corpses and detached bodily materials, including so-called ‘bio-specimens’. Reasoning from first principles, it highlights the practical and conceptual, as well as the political and philosophical, difficulties in this area, along with certain differences in the regulatory approach of European and US authorities. By way of conclusion, it proposes the law of authors’ and inventors’ rights as simultaneously offering a cautionary tale to those who would extend the reach of property even further than it extends currently and ideas for exploiting the malleability of the ‘property’ concept to manage the risks of extending it.


1993 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Munzer

A “human being,” Kant writes, “is not entitled to sell his limbs for money, even if he were offered ten thousand thalers for a single finger” (LE 124). This arresting statement is part of a broader position of Kant’s according to which persons lack property rights in parts of their own bodies. One can find in his work at least three arguments in support of this position. One is an argument from human freedom. It is riddled with difficulties. The second is an argument from humanity and dignity. It has general appeal but does little to justify Kant’s verdict on some of his own examples. The last is an argument from self-respect. It has some force. Yet, unless one tempers the Kant of moral opinion with the Kant of moral theory, this argument sometimes delivers unacceptable answers to casuistical questions.


1994 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen R. Munzer
Keyword(s):  

This essay deals with property rights in body parts that can be exchanged in a market. The inquiry arises in the following context. With some exceptions, the laws of many countries permit only the donation, not the sale, of body parts. Yet for some years there has existed a shortage of body parts for transplantation and other medical uses. It might then appear that if more sales were legally permitted, the supply of body parts would increase, because people would have more incentive to sell than they currently have to donate. To allow sales is to recognize property rights in body parts. To allow sales, however, makes body parts into “commodities”—that is, things that can be bought and sold in a market. And some view it as morally objectionable to treat body parts as commodities.


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