Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle

1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
JohnA. Weymark
Keyword(s):  
Pareto Principle ◽  
Social Aggregation ◽  
Weak Pareto Principle

scholarly journals THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A PARETIAN REPUBLICAN? SOME COMMENTS ON PETTIT AND SEN

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian List
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Pareto Principle ◽  
Domain Restriction ◽  
Liberal Paradox ◽  
Philip Pettit ◽  
Weak Pareto Principle ◽  
Universal Domain

Philip Pettit (2001) has suggested that there are parallels between his republican account of freedom and Amartya Sen's (1970) account of freedom as decisive preference. In this paper, I discuss these parallels from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. I sketch a formalization of republican freedom and argue that republican freedom is formally very similar to freedom as defined in Sen's “minimal liberalism” condition. In consequence, the republican account of freedom is vulnerable to a version of Sen's liberal paradox, an inconsistency between universal domain, freedom, and the weak Pareto principle. I argue that some standard escape routes from the liberal paradox – those via domain restriction – are not easily available to the republican. I suggest that republicans need to take seriously the challenge of the impossibility of a Paretian republican.

EQUAL VALUE OF LIFE AND THE PARETO PRINCIPLE

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Hasman ◽  
Lars Peter Østerdal
Keyword(s):  
Social Preference ◽  
Value Of Life ◽  
Social Value ◽  
Pareto Principle ◽  
Age Dependent ◽  
Weak Pareto Principle

A principle claiming equal entitlement to continued life has been strongly defended in the literature as a fundamental social value. We refer to this principle as ‘equal value of life'. In this paper we argue that there is a general incompatibility between the equal value of life principle and the weak Pareto principle and provide proof of this under mild structural assumptions. Moreover we demonstrate that a weaker, age-dependent version of the equal value of life principle is also incompatible with the weak Pareto principle. However, both principles can be satisfied if transitivity of social preference is relaxed to quasi-transitivity.

scholarly journals Drawing transmission graphs for COVID-19 in the perspective of network science

2020 ◽  
Vol 148 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Gürsakal ◽  
B. Batmaz ◽  
G. Aktuna
Keyword(s):  
Probability Distribution ◽  
Network Science ◽  
Pareto Distribution ◽  
Transmission Probability ◽  
Transmission Network ◽  
Pareto Principle ◽  
Infected People ◽  
Discrete Pareto Distribution ◽  
Local Transmission

Abstract When we consider a probability distribution about how many COVID-19-infected people will transmit the disease, two points become important. First, there could be super-spreaders in these distributions/networks and second, the Pareto principle could be valid in these distributions/networks regarding estimation that 20% of cases were responsible for 80% of local transmission. When we accept that these two points are valid, the distribution of transmission becomes a discrete Pareto distribution, which is a kind of power law. Having such a transmission distribution, then we can simulate COVID-19 networks and find super-spreaders using the centricity measurements in these networks. In this research, in the first we transformed a transmission distribution of statistics and epidemiology into a transmission network of network science and second we try to determine who the super-spreaders are by using this network and eigenvalue centrality measure. We underline that determination of transmission probability distribution is a very important point in the analysis of the epidemic and determining the precautions to be taken.

scholarly journals Frege’s puzzle and the ex ante Pareto principle

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Mahtani
Keyword(s):  
Policy Choice ◽  
Choice Situation ◽  
Pareto Principle ◽  
Social Situations ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Rational Behaviour ◽  
Fixed Population

Abstract The ex ante Pareto principle has an intuitive pull, and it has been a principle of central importance since Harsanyi’s defence of utilitarianism (to be found in e.g. Harsanyi, Rational behaviour and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. CUP, Cambridge, 1977). The principle has been used to criticize and refine a range of positions in welfare economics, including egalitarianism and prioritarianism. But this principle faces a serious problem. I have argued elsewhere (Mahtani, J Philos 114(6):303-323 2017) that the concept of ex ante Pareto superiority is not well defined, because its application in a choice situation concerning a fixed population can depend on how the members of that population are designated. I show in this paper that in almost all cases of policy choice, there will be numerous sets of rival designators for the same fixed population. I explore two ways that we might complete the definition of ex ante Pareto superiority. I call these the ‘supervaluationist’ reading and the ‘subvaluationist’ reading. I reject the subvaluationist reading as uncharitable, and argue that the supervaluationist reading is the most promising interpretation of the ex ante Pareto principle. I end by exploring some of the implications of this principle for prioritarianism and egalitarianism.

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