The German economy: Forecast Background

1978 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-10



Author(s):  
Karina Pasulka ◽  
◽  
Nataliya Kushnir ◽  

Introduction. The situation in the global economy and business during the COVID-19 pandemic is analyzed in this article. More than 30 million people worldwide have already been infected with the coronavirus, which came from China. However, the spread of the disease has also had an extremely serious impact on the economies of various countries in the world. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development has already said that it will take many years for the world to recover from the pandemic. EU GDP in the second quarter of 2020 showed a record decline - 14.4% year on year. The German economy returned to the level of 2011, the Spanish - in 2002, and the Italian economy was rejected in the early 1990s. These and other characteristics show the importance of research on this topic and problem, because it does not apply to a particular region or a particular country, but the whole world.



Author(s):  
Ashoka Mody

This chapter looks at the strong global economic recovery which took place in mid-2004, which accelerated world trade growth to historically high rates—a special advantage to European nations who all rely heavily for their economic well-being on international trade. With improved trade opportunities, even the struggling German economy began to show signs of life. The Eurozone, however, had economic and financial vulnerability. A source of instability inherent to monetary unity was vividly manifest during the crisis of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the early 1990s. A longer-term problem was the Eurozone's banks. Ultimately, the story of the next three years—between mid-2004 and mid-2007—revolves around a contest between the forces of “great moderation” and “irrational exuberance.” In the Eurozone, as member states benefited from an improving global economy, a belief in the European Central Bank's (ECB) distinctive ability to maintain stability reinforced the narrative of great moderation.



1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-208
Author(s):  
Neil Gregor

Since the end of the war itself, research on the German economy during the Second World War has focused – explicitly or implicitly – on the search for an explanation of the disparities in armaments and output between the first and second halves of the war. In the first half of the war, up until the winter of 1941–2, the development of armaments production was characterised by more or less stable levels of output against the background of the series of swift and successful military campaigns in Poland and in the West. This stands in stark contrast to the second half, which witnessed a radical increase in aggregate armaments output which lasted well into the summer of 1944, and which saw tank production reach 589 per cent of the level at which it had stood in January 1942, weapons production reach 382 per cent of its January 1942 level, and aircraft production 367 per cent of its January 1942 level over the same period, to name some of the most obvious successes. These increases were all the more astonishing for the fact that they were achieved against the background of a massive war of attrition on the Eastern Front which placed demands on German resources and drew male labour from German factories into the Wehrmacht on a scale out of all proportion to that experienced in the first half of the war.



2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 30-65
Author(s):  
Ben Lieberman

The history of the Federal Republic of Germany is closely connected with economic achievement. Enjoying a striking economic recovery in the 1950s, the FRG became the home of the “economic miracle.” Maturing into one of the most powerful economies in the world, it became known as the “German model” by the 1970s. Now, however, the chief metaphor for the German economy is “Standort Deutschland,” and therein lies the tale of the new German problem.



1966 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 615
Author(s):  
Sidney Ratner ◽  
Alan S. Milward
Keyword(s):  


Economica ◽  
1941 ◽  
Vol 8 (31) ◽  
pp. 337
Author(s):  
T. Prager ◽  
Gustav Stolper
Keyword(s):  


2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
GIOVANNI BERNARDINI

AbstractThis article focuses on the interplay between the political authorities and economic actors in the Federal Republic of Germany in the process of establishing relations with the People's Republic of China after 1949. Within this framework, the article will assess the role played by the Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft (Eastern Committee of German Economy), a semi-official organization recognized by the West German government. Both the ability of German economic actors and China's urgent need for economic contact with the West caused German-Chinese trade relations to circumvent the strict non-recognition policy followed by the West German government. The article also argues that, while economic relations heralded official recognition of the People's Republic of China by other Western European countries, in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany a division between the two spheres was finally accepted by the major actors involved, and ended only after the change of attitude imparted by the Nixon presidency in the United States during the early 1970s.



1962 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore K. Rabb
Keyword(s):  


Author(s):  
Michele K. Troy
Keyword(s):  

This chapter examines how Erich Kupfer, Albatross Press's managing director in Germany, handled the pressure of being asked by the Nazi authorities about disengaging Kurt Enoch from Albatross-Tauchnitz operations. On March 12, 1938, Adolf Hitler's troops invaded Austria. Around the same time, the Leipzig finance president continued to pressure Albatross and Bernhard Tauchnitz “to dismantle the distribution of both publishers via the Jewish firm Continenta in Paris.” Kupfer was queried by financial authorities on how and when Enoch might be removed from Albatross-Tauchnitz operations without damage to the firms' overall interests—a tenuous situation that tested his allegiance. This chapter shows how Kupfer aligned Albatross and Tauchnitz with the German economy, both of which would pay the cost of disentangling Enoch out of Albatross-Tauchnitz operations. It also discusses John Holroyd-Reece's initiatives aimed at safeguarding Albatross's assets in case of war.



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