Dimensions of criminal justice policy: The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment and the trial court system

1981 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-60
Author(s):  
Otis H. Stephens ◽  
Thomas D. Ungs
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nirej Sekhon

The Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the Fourth Amendment gold standard for regulating police discretion. It has embraced a "warrant preference" on the premise that requiring police to obtain advance judicial approval for searches and seizures encourages accurate identification of evidence and suspects while minimizing interference with constitutional rights. The Court and commentators have overlooked the fact that most outstanding warrants do none of these things. Most outstanding warrants are what this article terms "non-compliance warrants": summarily issued arrest warrants for failures to comply with a court or police order. State and local courts are profligate in issuing such warrants for minor offenses. For example, the Department of Justice found that the municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri issued one warrant for every two of its residents. When issued as wantonly as this, warrants are dangerous because they generate police discretion rather than restrain it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, most recently in Utah v. Strieff, treated non-compliance warrants as if no different from the traditional warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment warrant preference. This article argues that non-compliance warrants pose unique dangers, constitutional and otherwise. Non-compliance warrants create powerful incentives for the police to conduct unconstitutional stops, particularly in poor and minority neighborhoods. Their enforcement also generates race and class feedback loops. Outstanding warrants beget arrests and arrests beget more warrants. Over time, this dynamic amplifies race and class disparities in criminal justice. The article concludes by prescribing a Fourth Amendment remedy to deter unconstitutional warrant checks. More importantly, the article identifies steps state and local courts might take to stem the continued proliferation of non-compliance warrants.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-149
Author(s):  
Phyllis Ngugi

The Supreme Court decision in the now-infamous case Francis Karioko Muruatetu v Republic1 seemed to settle the enduring debate whether sentencing is a judicial or a legislative function. The court’s ruling was that sentencing is a judicial function and that the mandatory nature of the death penalty for murder2 was unconstitutional because it took away the courts’ discretion to determine a just and proportionate punishment to impose on a convicted person. In its judgment, the court ordered that the judiciary sentencing policy3 be revised to reflect the court’s guidelines on the obligation of courts to listen to the accused’s mitigation before sentencing. The court also directed that a framework for sentence rehearing be prepared immediately to allow applicants who had been sentenced in circumstances similar to those of the petitioners to apply for sentence a rehearing from the trial court. This article examines the aftermath of this judgment in terms of whether the Supreme Court’s decision helped to cure the challenge that lies in the current sentencing process; achieving coherence and proportionality in the sentencing process. By using jurisprudential arguments, we intend to demonstrate that, despite the court’s direction to all courts to ensure that no person should be subjected to a disproportionate sentence, the problem of disproportional sentencing is one that goes beyond merely reviewing of the sentencing guidelines but also demands a reform of the entire criminal justice system.


1972 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
Donal E.J. Macnamara ◽  
Edward Sagarin

Three important changes in American society were given impetus by decisions of the Supreme Court under Earl Warren. These were in the issues of desegregation; one-man, one-vote; and the administration of criminal justice. The accusation against the Warren Court that it was coddling criminals and handcuffing police, belied by statistics, may have been incited by hostility that the Court had aroused because of its decisions on integration and electoral apportionment. Analysis of impor tant decisions in the years before Warren reveals a hesitant and ambiguous Court, taking both forward and backward steps in defense of the constitutional rights of the accused. Some of the Warren decisions on issues of criminal justice were unani mous, and others were made by a split court. A study of the voting records of Warren's colleagues leads to the belief that the major thrust of that court will not be reversed by its successor, unless under the pressure of a precipitate change in America's social atmosphere.


Author(s):  
Dickson Brice

This chapter selects five issues within the sphere of criminal justice to exemplify how the Irish Supreme Court has made its mark in the field. It looks first at the Court’s approach to the principle that prosecutions should be ended if they are unfair to the defendant and then moves to related issues surrounding use of the Special Criminal Court. It considers whether the Supreme Court has done enough to police the Special Criminal Court and whether reforms are necessary in that domain. In examining the Supreme Court’s views on the right to bail and on the admissibility of evidence which has been obtained unconstitutionally or otherwise illegally (with particular reference to the Damache and JC cases), comparisons are made with other common law jurisdictions. A final section looks at the Supreme Court’s position regarding the retrospectivity of declarations of incompatibility in criminal cases.


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