Special relations in automated deduction

Author(s):  
Zohar Manna ◽  
Richard Waldinger
1986 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zohar Manna ◽  
Richard Waldinger

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. L. Malchow
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Dušan Guller

2018 ◽  
Vol 453 ◽  
pp. 30-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurelie Montarnal ◽  
Wenxin Mu ◽  
Frederick Benaben ◽  
Jacques Lamothe ◽  
Matthieu Lauras ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
T. Andreeva

The article covers the role the Great Britain has played as a fourth independent political actor of international relations, along with the U.S., EU and NATO, in the political crisis in Ukraine from its very beginning (2014), and in finding quick and effective ways of solving it. The article also explores the worsening of the bilateral relationship between UK and Russia under the influence of the 2014–2015 Ukrainian crisis, in a wide context of antagonism between the U.S. and Russia. There are several factors introduced in the article which hampered the crisis from the start and which still can be used to improve the bilateral relations in the nearest future. The author scrutinizes the evolution of the Britain's stance on the Ukrainian upheaval at the beginning of 2014, the Crimea annexation/joining perceived as a violation of the international law, Russia's interference in the conflict in the Eastern territories of Ukraine, and the imposing of sever EU and U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article highlights the influence of the Ukrainian crisis on the strengthening of Anglo-American “special relations” and on the revival of the NATO strategic role as a tool to confront Russia not only in this conflict, but also on the world stage. The author tries to assess the scope of damage for the UK–Russia relationship made by the Ukrainian crisis and answer the questions: where has British participation in this crisis boosted the Great Britain's world standing, when can the UK–Russia relations become better again, and what can help improve the relationship between two countries?


1978 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 739-757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay Sen Budhraj

At a Press conference held soon after assuming office as Prime Minister on 24 March 1977, Morarji R. Desai said that his Government would follow a policy of “proper non-alignment”. He also said that his Government would not wish to have any “special” relations with any one country. Obviously he had the Soviet Union in mind when he made this observation; for it is often asserted that the 20-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Co-operation between India and the Soviet Union signed in August 1971 had established “special” relations between the two countries. Commenting on this treaty, the new Prime Minister said that if it meant that India should not have friendship with other countries, then it would have to change. “At least we will not act upon it in that manner.”1 Again, four days later, addressing the first joint session of the sixth Parliament, the Acting President stated that the new Government would “follow a path of genuine non-alignment”. This article is an attempt to explain what led to the establishment of “special” relations, why there were hints about a change in these relations when those whom Indira Gandhi had jailed replaced her in office in March 1977, and what actually happened thereafter. It is also an attempt to explain why the Janata Government continued the policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and to assess the elements of continuity and change in Indo-Soviet relations.


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