Evaluating and changing representation in concept acquisition

2005 ◽  
pp. 89-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Bergadano ◽  
F. Esposito ◽  
C. Rouveirol ◽  
S. Wrobel
Keyword(s):  
Concept Acquisition

Demonstrative Thought

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Concept Acquisition ◽  
Phenomenal Concept ◽  
Demonstrative Reference ◽  
Demonstrative Thought ◽  
Phenomenal Concept Strategy

In this paper I develop a model of what it is to entertain a demonstrative thought, whether about an individual or a property. The primary question I investigate is the mechanism responsible for securing the referent of the demonstrative component of the thought. I characterize mechanisms of demonstrative reference for both token-demonstratives and type-demonstratives, drawing a distinction between genuine type-demonstratives and “quasi” type-demonstratives in the process. I then use the results of this discussion to criticize various philosophical uses of the notion of a demonstrative concept, including the “phenomenal concept strategy” for responding to challenges to materialism and the attempt to explain concept acquisition by appeal to demonstrative concepts.

scholarly journals A Novel Concept Acquisition Approach Based on Formal Contexts

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting Qian ◽  
Ling Wei
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Formal Concept Analysis ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
New Method ◽  
Concept Acquisition ◽  
Formal Concept ◽  
Knowledge Processing ◽  
Formal Concepts ◽  
Novel Concept

As an important tool for data analysis and knowledge processing, formal concept analysis (FCA) has been applied to many fields. In this paper, we introduce a new method to find all formal concepts based on formal contexts. The amount of intents calculation is reduced by the method. And the corresponding algorithm of our approach is proposed. The main theorems and the corresponding algorithm are examined by examples, respectively. At last, several real-life databases are analyzed to demonstrate the application of the proposed approach. Experimental results show that the proposed approach is simple and effective.

scholarly journals Concept acquisition and scientific literacy of physics within inquiry-based learning for STEM Education

2021 ◽  
Vol 1835 (1) ◽  
pp. 012012
Author(s):  
Lia Yuliati ◽  
Fitrika Yogismawati ◽  
Endang Purwaningsih ◽  
Yessi Affriyenni
Keyword(s):  
Stem Education ◽  
Scientific Literacy ◽  
Concept Acquisition ◽  
Inquiry Based Learning

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AMONG REPRESSORS AND SENSITIZERS IN CONCEPTUAL SKILLS

1973 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 144-152
Author(s):  
William H. Bergouist ◽  
John T. Lloyd ◽  
Sandra L. Johansson
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Flexibility ◽  
Concept Acquisition ◽  
Conceptual Skills ◽  
Disjunctive Concepts ◽  
Conjunctive Concepts ◽  
Better Than

Sensitizers were hypothesized to perform significantly better than repressors on eleven concept acquisition tasks. Differences between repression-sensitization (R-S) groups (n = 48), as measured by the Byrne R-S scale, were found to be significant on several of these tasks. As compared with repressors, sensitizers more rapidly acquired: (a) A disjunctive nonverbal concept, when a set for conjunctive concepts had to be broken (p < 0.05); and (b) Two verbal concepts (p < 0.05). Medium scoring subjects performed significantly better than repressors in acquiring: (a) Nonverbal disjunctive concepts (p < 0.05); and (b) Verbal concepts (p < 0.05). R-S results are discussed with reference to conceptual skills and “cognitive flexibility”.

Implications of multi-image for concept acquisition

ECTJ ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-302
Author(s):  
David H. Jonassen
Keyword(s):  
Concept Acquisition

Normativity and Concepts

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannah Ginsborg
Keyword(s):  
Concept Acquisition ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Rule Governed Behavior

A number of philosophers, including Kant, Kripke, Boghossian, Gibbard and Brandom, can be read as endorsing the view that concepts are normative. I distinguish two versions of that view: a strong, non-naturalistic version which identifies concepts with norms or rules (Kant, Kripke), and a weaker version, compatible with naturalism, on which the normativity of concepts amounts only to their application’s being governed by norms or rules (Boghossian, Gibbard, Brandom). I consider a problem for the strong version: grasp of a rule seems to require grasp of the concepts which constitute the content of that rule, so how can we explain concept acquisition without falling into regress? I offer a Kantian response, on which grasp of a rule does not require antecedent grasp of concepts, but still involves the recognition of normativity in one’s rule-governed behavior. I distinguish the normativity of concepts, so understood, from the normativity associated with truth or warrant.

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