Lo sviluppo delle discipline

The birth and development of disciplines, as organized knowledge that guides the interpretation of reality, are inscribed in the heritage of the knowledge of our species. These follow the triple regulating principles of the historical flux of the meanings of feeling and thinking: cognitive potential, mental processing, intangible and tangible products. The flow from the indistinct feeling of the origins evolves through the archaic forms of the magic thought; to the ancient forms of declarative thought up to the modern forms of demonstrative thought. The latter with the separation between disciplines does not recognize the interconnection inherent in reality, loses the scientific revolution character and generates the unsustainable human development on the planet. From the global interconnection experience of the contemporary world, a new paradigm comes to life: transdisciplinarity, whose epistemology recomposes the knowledge and reality’s unity and diversity beyond the barriers between disciplines.

Perception, Experience, and Direct Realism

Direct Realism is the thesis that our perception of mind-independent things is routinely direct. It is true if and only if, routinely, our perception of mind-independent things is not by means of perceiving something that is distinct and separate from those things. This chapter defends Direct Realism. It begins with an examination of reasons that have been given in the past for rejecting it, focusing on Hume and G. E. Moore. There follows a discussion of relationalist versus non-relationalist conceptions of perceptual experience. Particular attention is given to reconciling a non-relationalist conception with Direct Realism. To this end discussion is focused on how perception facilitates perceptual–demonstrative thought. An important role is played by a view of how to understand non-committal descriptions of experiences. This view figures in a response to problems raised by Michael Martin for non-relationist conceptions of experience.

Perception and the Vagaries of Experience

An adequate theory of perception would be Direct Realist in that it represents our perception of things in our surroundings to be routinely direct. This paper considers what Direct Realism is and how it constrains a theory of sensory experience. Some Direct Realists—relationalists—hold additionally that, for instance, the visual experiences implicated in visual perceptions of our surroundings are essentially relational in that they are episodes of awareness of mind-independent objects. There are Direct Realists who are not relationalists. This discussion explores what is at issue between these different camps. Relationalists think that non-relationalists cannot make sense of the connection between perception and demonstrative thought. It is argued that the reasons commonly given for pessimism on this score are not good. A constructive proposal on behalf of non-relationalists is sketched. The discussion concludes by briefly considering whether the non-relationalist conception of experience enables us to make sense of empiricism.

Demonstrative Thought

In this paper I develop a model of what it is to entertain a demonstrative thought, whether about an individual or a property. The primary question I investigate is the mechanism responsible for securing the referent of the demonstrative component of the thought. I characterize mechanisms of demonstrative reference for both token-demonstratives and type-demonstratives, drawing a distinction between genuine type-demonstratives and “quasi” type-demonstratives in the process. I then use the results of this discussion to criticize various philosophical uses of the notion of a demonstrative concept, including the “phenomenal concept strategy” for responding to challenges to materialism and the attempt to explain concept acquisition by appeal to demonstrative concepts.

Quality and Content

The papers presented in this volume cover topics, such as the “phenomenal concept strategy,” to defend materialism from anti-materialist intuitions, the doctrine of representationalism about phenomenal character, the modal argument against materialism, the nature of demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology. On the one hand, I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy cannot work and that representationalism has certain fatal flaws, at least if it’s to be joined to a materialist metaphysics. On the other, I defend materialism from the modal argument, arguing that it relies on a questionable conflation of semantic and metaphysical issues. I also provide a naturalistic theory of demonstrative thought, criticizing certain philosophical arguments involving that notion in the process. I argue as well that the peculiarly subjective nature of secondary qualities provides a window into the nature of the relation between phenomenal character and intentional content, and conclude that relation involves a robust notion of acquaintance.