Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision

2005 ◽  
pp. 93-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sten Lindström ◽  
Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Entrenchment ◽  
Relational Belief

scholarly journals Epistemic-entrenchment Characterization of Parikh’s Axiom

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theofanis Aravanis ◽  
Pavlos Peppas ◽  
Mary-Anne Williams
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Epistemic Entrenchment ◽  
New Information ◽  
Additional Constraints ◽  
Belief Set

In this article, we provide the epistemic-entrenchment characterization of the weak version of Parikh’s relevance-sensitive axiom for belief revision — known as axiom (P) — for the general case of incomplete theories. Loosely speaking, axiom (P) states that, if a belief set K can be divided into two disjoint compartments, and the new information φ relates only to the first compartment, then the second compartment should not be affected by the revision of K by φ. The above-mentioned characterization, essentially, constitutes additional constraints on epistemic-entrenchment preorders, that induce AGM revision functions, satisfying the weak version of Parikh’s axiom (P).

How to Model Relational Belief Revision

1994 ◽  
pp. 69-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz ◽  
Sten Lindström
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Relational Belief

scholarly journals Irrevocable belief revision and epistemic entrenchment

2000 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 645-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Ferme
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Entrenchment

scholarly journals Full Characterization of Parikh's Relevance-Sensitive Axiom for Belief Revision

2019 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 765-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theofanis Aravanis ◽  
Pavlos Peppas ◽  
Mary-Anne Williams
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Selection Function ◽  
Intellectual Activity ◽  
Epistemic Entrenchment ◽  
Full Characterization ◽  
New Information ◽  
Constructive Models ◽  
Almost All

In this article, the epistemic-entrenchment and partial-meet characterizations of Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom for belief revision, known as axiom (P), are provided. In short, axiom (P) states that, if a belief set $K$ can be divided into two disjoint compartments, and the new information $\varphi$ relates only to the first compartment, then the revision of $K$ by $\varphi$ should not affect the second compartment. Accordingly, we identify the subclass of epistemic-entrenchment and that of selection-function preorders, inducing AGM revision functions that satisfy axiom (P). Hence, together with the faithful-preorders characterization of (P) that has already been provided, Parikh's axiom is fully characterized in terms of all popular constructive models of Belief Revision. Since the notions of relevance and local change are inherent in almost all intellectual activity, the completion of the constructive view of (P) has a significant impact on many theoretical, as well as applied, domains of Artificial Intelligence.

Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one’s own knowledge and belief revision.

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (12) ◽  
pp. 2319-2332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Hagá ◽  
Kristina R. Olson
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Learning Perceptions

Children change their answers in response to neutral follow-up questions by a knowledgeable asker

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Patrick Shafto ◽  
Yue Yu ◽  
Sophie Elizabeth Colby Bridgers ◽  
Aaron Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Correct Answer ◽  
New Information ◽  
Common Practices ◽  
Parent Child

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator’s intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent-child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children’s reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.

Positive versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision

Noûs ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision
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