Fine-Tuning Accuracy Using Conditional Probability of the Bottom Sign-Bit in Fixed-Width Modified Booth Multiplier

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (7) ◽  
pp. 3115-3130
Author(s):  
Yuan-Ho Chen ◽  
Chung-Yi Li ◽  
Lu-An Lai
ASHA Leader ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christi Miller
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 216-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Venkatesh Iyengar ◽  
Ibrahim Elmadfa

The food safety security (FSS) concept is perceived as an early warning system for minimizing food safety (FS) breaches, and it functions in conjunction with existing FS measures. Essentially, the function of FS and FSS measures can be visualized in two parts: (i) the FS preventive measures as actions taken at the stem level, and (ii) the FSS interventions as actions taken at the root level, to enhance the impact of the implemented safety steps. In practice, along with FS, FSS also draws its support from (i) legislative directives and regulatory measures for enforcing verifiable, timely, and effective compliance; (ii) measurement systems in place for sustained quality assurance; and (iii) shared responsibility to ensure cohesion among all the stakeholders namely, policy makers, regulators, food producers, processors and distributors, and consumers. However, the functional framework of FSS differs from that of FS by way of: (i) retooling the vulnerable segments of the preventive features of existing FS measures; (ii) fine-tuning response systems to efficiently preempt the FS breaches; (iii) building a long-term nutrient and toxicant surveillance network based on validated measurement systems functioning in real time; (iv) focusing on crisp, clear, and correct communication that resonates among all the stakeholders; and (v) developing inter-disciplinary human resources to meet ever-increasing FS challenges. Important determinants of FSS include: (i) strengthening international dialogue for refining regulatory reforms and addressing emerging risks; (ii) developing innovative and strategic action points for intervention {in addition to Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) procedures]; and (iii) introducing additional science-based tools such as metrology-based measurement systems.


Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.


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