This paper studies values for cooperative games with transferable utility. Numerous such values can be characterized by axioms of [Formula: see text]-associated consistency, which require that a value is invariant under some parametrized linear transformation [Formula: see text] on the vector space of cooperative games with transferable utility. Xu et al. [(2008) Linear Algebr. Appl. 428, 1571–1586; (2009) Linear Algebr. Appl. 430, 2896–2897] Xu et al. [(2013) Linear Algebr. Appl. 439, 2205–2215], Hamiache [(2010) Int. Game Theor. Rev. 12, 175–187] and more recently Xu et al. [(2015) Linear Algebr. Appl. 471, 224–240] follow this approach by using a matrix analysis. The main drawback of these articles is the heaviness of the proofs to show that the matrix expression of the linear transformations is diagonalizable. By contrast, we provide quick proofs by relying on the Jordan normal form of the previous matrix.
Associated consistency and values for TU games
