THE RIVER SHARING PROBLEM: A SURVEY

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1340016 ◽  
Author(s):  
SYLVAIN BEAL ◽  
AMANDINE GHINTRAN ◽  
ERIC REMILA ◽  
PHILIPPE SOLAL
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Cooperative Tu Game ◽  
Fair Distribution

The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor. 107, 453–462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of riparian agents. Solutions to that problem are reviewed in this article. These solutions are obtained via an axiomatic study on the class of river TU-games or via a market mechanism.

NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (03) ◽  
pp. 1250018 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN C. CESCO
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Additional Axiom ◽  
Game Property ◽  
Minimality Property ◽  
New Framework

In this paper we introduce two related core-type solutions for games with transferable utility (TU-games) the [Formula: see text]-core and the [Formula: see text]-core. The elements of the solutions are pairs [Formula: see text] where x, as usual, is a vector representing a distribution of utility and [Formula: see text] is a balanced family of coalitions, in the case of the [Formula: see text]-core, and a minimal balanced one, in the case of the [Formula: see text]-core, describing a plausible organization of the players to achieve the vector x. Both solutions extend the notion of classical core but, unlike it, they are always nonempty for any TU-game. For the [Formula: see text]-core, which also exhibits a certain kind of "minimality" property, we provide a nice axiomatic characterization in terms of the four axioms nonemptiness (NE), individual rationality (IR), superadditivity (SUPA) and a weak reduced game property (WRGP) (with appropriate modifications to adapt them to the new framework) used to characterize the classical core. However, an additional axiom, the axiom of equal opportunity is required. It roughly states that if [Formula: see text] belongs to the [Formula: see text]-core then, any other admissible element of the form [Formula: see text] should belong to the solution too.

A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 935-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xun-Feng Hu ◽  
Deng-Feng Li
Keyword(s):  
Equal Division ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Equal Surplus Division

In this paper, we propose a variation of weak covariance named as non-singleton covariance, requiring that changing the worth of a non-singleton coalition in a TU game affects the payoffs of all players equally. We establish that this covariance is characteristic for the convex combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value, together with efficiency and a one-parameterized axiom treating a particular kind of players specially. As special cases, parallel axiomatizations of the two values are also provided.

The Need for Permission, the Power to Enforce, and Duality in Cooperative Games with a Hierarchy

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Huettner ◽  
Harald Wiese
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Permission Value

A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) captures a situation in which players can achieve certain payoffs by cooperating. We assume that the players are part of a hierarchy. In the literature, this invokes the assumption that subordinates cannot cooperate without the permission of their superiors. Instead, we assume that superiors can force their subordinates to cooperate. We show how both notions correspond to each other by means of dual TU games. This way, we capture the idea that a superiors’ ability to enforce cooperation can be seen as the ability to neutralize her subordinate’s threat to abstain from cooperation. Moreover, we introduce the coercion value for games with a hierarchy and provide characterizations thereof that reveal the similarity to the permission value.

U-CYCLES IN n-PERSON TU-GAMES WITH ONLY 1, n - 1 AND n-PERSON PERMISSIBLE COALITIONS

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 355-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN CARLOS CESCO ◽  
ANA LUCÍA CALÍ
Keyword(s):  
Characterization Theorem ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Transfer Scheme ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Core Of A Game ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

It has been recently proved that the non-existence of certain type of cycles of pre-imputation, fundamental cycles, is equivalent to the balancedness of a TU-games (Cesco (2003)). In some cases, the class of fundamental cycles can be narrowed and still obtain a characterization theorem. In this paper we prove that existence of maximal U-cycles, which are related to a transfer scheme designed for computing a point in the core of a game, is condition necessary and sufficient for a TU-game be non-balanced, provided n - 1 and n-person are the only coalitions with non-zero value. These games are strongly related to games with only 1, n - 1 and n-person permissible coalitions (Maschler (1963)).

scholarly journals Optimal Allocation Method for a Fair Distribution of the Benefits in an Energy Community

Solar RRL ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valeria Casalicchio ◽  
Giampaolo Manzolini ◽  
Matteo Giacomo Prina ◽  
David Moser
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Allocation Method ◽  
Fair Distribution ◽  
Energy Community

LARGENESS OF THE CORE OF k-CONVEX SYMMETRIC GAMES

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (04) ◽  
pp. 1340023
Author(s):  
AMIT K BISWAS
Keyword(s):  
Core Structure ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Convex Games ◽  
Large Core ◽  
Convex Game ◽  
The Core ◽  
Symmetric Games ◽  
Cooperative Tu Game

A cooperative TU game is said to posses a large core as defined by Sharkey [1982] if for every acceptable vector there is a smaller core vector in the game. This paper is devoted to characterization(s) of largeness of the core of a subclass of games known as k-convex games (containing the convex games in case k = n). The k-convex games were defined by Driessen [1988] because of the core structure they possess, which is the same as that of a suitably defined convex game. The main goal is to show that the totally balanced symmetric k-convex games possess a large core if and only if the game is convex.

scholarly journals KONSEP FISKAL ISLAM DALAM PERSPEKTIF HISTORIS

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Ali Murtadho
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Budget Deficit ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Wealth Distribution ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Distribution Of Wealth ◽  
Fiscal Revenue ◽  
Fair Distribution ◽  
Islamic Economic ◽  
Practical Representation

<p><em>Fiscal policy is not synonymous with Islam taxation / tribute that made the king / emperor , nor synonymous with modern fiscal policy born of the failure of the free market mechanism. Referring to public finance policy at the beginning of the Islamic era, Islamic fiscal policy is a practical representation of the mission of the Islamic economic system oriented religiosity , justice and wealth distribution.</em></p><em>Not only deal with the fiscal revenue and expenditure of state revenue but also about the mission of fair distribution of wealth . Jizya, kharaj and ghanimah is a fiscal instrument in accordance with the circumstances at that time for the mission fair distribution of wealth . Based on the concept of fiscal Islam , then the application of fiscal policy now must somehow form could lead to a fair distribution of wealth towards a comprehensive community welfare ( falah ), not just the budget deficit </em>

scholarly journals Research on the Allocation of Flood Drainage Rights of the Sunan Canal Based on a Bi-level Multi-Objective Programming Model

Water ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 1769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dandan Zhang ◽  
Juqin Shen ◽  
Fuhua Sun ◽  
Bo Liu ◽  
Zeyu Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Flood Control ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Iteration Algorithm ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Multi Objective Programming ◽  
Fairness And Efficiency ◽  
Comprehensive Benefit ◽  
Objective Programming

To reduce flood disasters and optimize of the comprehensive benefit of the water basin, the allocation of regional flood drainage rights is of great significance. Using the “top-down” allocation mode, we consider the influence of the social, economic, and ecological environments, flood drainage demand and efficiency, and other factors on the allocation of flood drainage rights. A bi-level multi-objective programming model from the perspective of fairness and efficiency is established for the allocation. The Sunan Canal is taken as a typical case study. The model is solved by the multi-objective optimal allocation method and the master–slave hierarchical interactive iteration algorithm. After three iterations of the initial solution, the allocation of flood drainage rights in six flood control regions finally reach an effective state. The results of the model were compared with results based on historical allocation principles, showing that the bi-level multi-objective programming model, based on the principles of fairness and efficiency, is more in line with the current social and economic development of the canal. In view of the institutional background of water resources management in China and the flood drainage pressure faced by various regions, the allocation of flood drainage rights should be comprehensively considered in combination with various factors, and the market mechanism should be utilized to optimize the allocation.

A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (03) ◽  
pp. 383-389
Author(s):  
JUAN CARLOS CESCO
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Tu Game ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Classical Condition ◽  
Stable Core ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

In this note we provide a neccesary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core of a general structured TU-game which resembles closely the classical condition of balancedness given by Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) to guarantee the non-emptiness of the classical core. Structured games have been introduced in Herings et al. (2007a) and more recently, in Herings et al. (2007b), studied in the framework of games with transferable utility. In the latter paper, the authors provide suffcient conditions for the non-emptiness of the socially stable core, but up to now, no necessary and sufficient condition is known.

The simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-game

Top ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svetlana Tarashnina
Keyword(s):  
Tu Game ◽  
Cooperative Tu Game
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