Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josep E. Peris ◽  
M. Carmen Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Sets

Bargaining in Legislatures

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 1181-1206 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron ◽  
John A. Ferejohn
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
The Social ◽  
Free Model ◽  
Sequential Nature ◽  
Choice Literature ◽  
Formal Rules

Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.

A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures

2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 809-829 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Campbell ◽  
Jerry S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Procedures ◽  
Strategy Proof

A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism

1986 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Masarani ◽  
S.Sadik Gokturk
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Pareto Optimal

scholarly journals A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 711-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shurojit Chatterji ◽  
Arunava Sen ◽  
Huaxia Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions

On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Doghmi
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Full Characterization ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Domain Restrictions ◽  
Social Choice Correspondences ◽  
No Veto Power

AbstractIn this paper we give a full characterization of Nash implementability of social choice correspondences (SCCs) in allotment economies on preference domains with private values and different types of indifference. We focus on single-peaked/single-plateaued preferences with worst indifferent allocations, single-troughed preferences and single-troughed preferences with best indifferent allocations. We begin by introducing a weak variant of no-veto power, called

The Jenkins Commission and the Implications of Electoral Reform for the UK Constitution

1999 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Choice Sets ◽  
The Uk

THERE ARE TWO MAIN CONCEPTIONS OF ‘REPRESENTATION’ IN democratic theory, and they are not wholly compatible. All democratic electoral systems implicitly appeal to one or the other conception of representation. Therefore, the nature of an ideal electoral system is an essentially contested question. Furthermore, the mathematics of social choice sets severe limits on what an electoral system — any electoral system — can achieve. Though the implications of social choice are not so nihilistic as some would have us believe, they are relevant and serious.

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