scholarly journals COVID-19 and the Political Economy of Shared Adjustment

2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (5) ◽  
pp. 278-283
Author(s):  
Ralf Boscheck
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Reform ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civic Virtues ◽  
The Eu

AbstractBy April 2021, the COVID-19 crisis in Europe had reached a magnitude that, in the eyes of some observers, either deepened lingering divides and threatened the EU’s very existence, or, conversely, forced the Union to address the fundamental flaws of its euro area and provided an opportunity to reboot. From the outset, the EU had to confront fundamental challenges that require coordination; however, decentralised coordination is best as it improves the quality of policy, economic efficiency and civic virtues. While some argue for a debt union to provide the answer to the EU’s call for shared adjustment, a solution should rather be sought in economic reform, accountability and enforcement of constitutional commitments.

ESMA as a Residual Lawmaker: The Political Economy and Constitutionality of ESMA’s Product Intervention Measures on Complex Financial Products

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Iglesias-Rodríguez
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
The Political ◽  
Regulatory Arbitrage ◽  
Financial Products ◽  
Intervention Measures ◽  
Binary Options ◽  
The One ◽  
National Competent Authorities ◽  
The Eu

AbstractThis article proposes that product intervention constitutes a form of residual lawmaking by ESMA that allows it to tackle aspects of investor protection not addressed by EU incomplete financial laws. Whilst product intervention may bring about certain advantages and may contribute to mitigating regulatory arbitrage problems, it constitutes a highly intrusive regulatory mechanism that raises important questions concerning: (a) ESMA’s rationale and motivations for its use; (b) its compliance with the EU constitutional framework; and (c) its adequacy for the regulation of complex financial products. This article addresses these questions through an analysis of the rationale and consequences of ESMA’s product intervention measures on binary options and contracts for differences of May 2018–July 2019, and of recent reforms of ESMA’s powers. It offers three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it contributes to the literature on administrative discretion and agencies’ rulemaking through an analysis of the political economy of ESMA’s deployment of product intervention powers and, also, of what this reveals about the relationships between ESMA and the EU Institutions, on the one side, and ESMA and National Competent Authorities, on the other. Second, it contributes to the literature on the constitutionality of EU agencies through an examination of the compliance of ESMA’s product intervention measures with EU constitutional law and requirements. Third, it examines whether product intervention constitutes an adequate mechanism to address problems pertaining to investor protection in complex financial products markets and, in doing so, it contributes to the scholarly discussion on complex financial products’ regulation.

scholarly journals The political economy of agri-environmental measures: An empirical assessment at the eu regional level

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 71-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danilo Bertoni ◽  
Alessandro Olper
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Econometric Model ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
The Political ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Economic Determinants ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Environmental Measures ◽  
The Eu

The paper deals with the political and economic determinants of EU agri-environmental measures (AEMs) applied by 59 regional/country units, during the 2001-2004 period. Five different groups of determinants, spanning from positive and negative externalities, to political institutions, are highlighted and tested using an econometric model. Main results show that AEMs implementation is mostly affected by the strength of the farm lobby, and the demand for positive externalities. At the same time it emerges a prominent role played by political institutions. On the contrary, AEMs do not seem implemented by the willingness to address negative externalities.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Brexit: Why Making It Easier to Leave the Club Could Improve the EU

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 214-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Bongardt ◽  
Francisco Torres
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Eu

scholarly journals Fiscal and Other Rules in EU Economic Governance: Helpful, Largely Irrelevant or Unenforceable?

2017 ◽  
Vol 239 ◽  
pp. R3-R13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Begg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
The Political ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Macroeconomic Imbalances ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

EU Member States, particularly in the Euro Area, have been pushed to adopt more extensive and intrusive fiscal rules, but what is the evidence that the rules are succeeding? The EU level Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been – and remains – the most visible rule-book, but it has been complemented by a profusion of national rules and by new provisions on other sources of macroeconomic imbalance. Much of the analysis of rules has concentrated on their technical merits, but tends to neglect the political economy of compliance. This paper examines the latter, looking at compliance with fiscal rules at EU and Member State levels and at the rules-based mechanisms for curbing other macroeconomic imbalances. It concludes that politically driven implementation and enforcement shortcomings have been given too little attention, putting at risk the integrity and effectiveness of the rules.

The Political Economy of Trust

2019 ◽  
pp. 627-648
Author(s):  
Christian Bjørnskov
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Social Trust ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Reverse Causality ◽  
Quality Of Institutions

This chapter provides a selective survey of the literature on social trust in public choice and political economy. It outlines the empirical evidence and discusses theoretical channels through which social trust can affect the quality of institutions and policies, and the conditions under which such mechanisms are likely to work. It also addresses the discussion of reverse causality, that is, whether good institutions or policies actively create trust. It then discusses whether trust can be created or destroyed by activist government policy or accidental institutional changes. Its main focus is on the set of theories and evidence of the association between social trust and institutions of governance.

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