Greece, Financialization and the EU: The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction

AbstractThis article proposes that product intervention constitutes a form of residual lawmaking by ESMA that allows it to tackle aspects of investor protection not addressed by EU incomplete financial laws. Whilst product intervention may bring about certain advantages and may contribute to mitigating regulatory arbitrage problems, it constitutes a highly intrusive regulatory mechanism that raises important questions concerning: (a) ESMA’s rationale and motivations for its use; (b) its compliance with the EU constitutional framework; and (c) its adequacy for the regulation of complex financial products. This article addresses these questions through an analysis of the rationale and consequences of ESMA’s product intervention measures on binary options and contracts for differences of May 2018–July 2019, and of recent reforms of ESMA’s powers. It offers three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it contributes to the literature on administrative discretion and agencies’ rulemaking through an analysis of the political economy of ESMA’s deployment of product intervention powers and, also, of what this reveals about the relationships between ESMA and the EU Institutions, on the one side, and ESMA and National Competent Authorities, on the other. Second, it contributes to the literature on the constitutionality of EU agencies through an examination of the compliance of ESMA’s product intervention measures with EU constitutional law and requirements. Third, it examines whether product intervention constitutes an adequate mechanism to address problems pertaining to investor protection in complex financial products markets and, in doing so, it contributes to the scholarly discussion on complex financial products’ regulation.

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The political economy of agri-environmental measures: An empirical assessment at the eu regional level

Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce ◽

10.19041/apstract/2012/3-4/10 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 6 (3-4) ◽

pp. 71-82 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Danilo Bertoni ◽

Alessandro Olper

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Political Institutions ◽

Econometric Model ◽

Regional Level ◽

The Political ◽

Negative Externalities ◽

Economic Determinants ◽

Positive Externalities ◽

Environmental Measures ◽

The Eu

The paper deals with the political and economic determinants of EU agri-environmental measures (AEMs) applied by 59 regional/country units, during the 2001-2004 period. Five different groups of determinants, spanning from positive and negative externalities, to political institutions, are highlighted and tested using an econometric model. Main results show that AEMs implementation is mostly affected by the strength of the farm lobby, and the demand for positive externalities. At the same time it emerges a prominent role played by political institutions. On the contrary, AEMs do not seem implemented by the willingness to address negative externalities.

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The Political Economy of Brexit: Why Making It Easier to Leave the Club Could Improve the EU

Intereconomics ◽

10.1007/s10272-016-0605-z ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 51 (4) ◽

pp. 214-219 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Annette Bongardt ◽

Francisco Torres

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

The Political ◽

The Eu

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Fiscal and Other Rules in EU Economic Governance: Helpful, Largely Irrelevant or Unenforceable?

National Institute Economic Review ◽

10.1177/002795011723900110 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 239 ◽

pp. R3-R13 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Iain Begg

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Fiscal Rules ◽

The Political ◽

Stability And Growth Pact ◽

Economic Governance ◽

Eu Member States ◽

Growth Pact ◽

Macroeconomic Imbalances ◽

Eu Economic Governance ◽

The Eu

EU Member States, particularly in the Euro Area, have been pushed to adopt more extensive and intrusive fiscal rules, but what is the evidence that the rules are succeeding? The EU level Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been – and remains – the most visible rule-book, but it has been complemented by a profusion of national rules and by new provisions on other sources of macroeconomic imbalance. Much of the analysis of rules has concentrated on their technical merits, but tends to neglect the political economy of compliance. This paper examines the latter, looking at compliance with fiscal rules at EU and Member State levels and at the rules-based mechanisms for curbing other macroeconomic imbalances. It concludes that politically driven implementation and enforcement shortcomings have been given too little attention, putting at risk the integrity and effectiveness of the rules.

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Emergency Keynesianism 2.0: The political economy of fiscal policy in Europe during the Corona Crisis

Samfundsøkonomen ◽

10.7146/samfundsokonomen.v0i4.123557 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 16-26

Author(s):

Cornel Ban

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Fiscal Policy ◽

Crisis Management ◽

The Self ◽

Fiscal Crisis ◽

The Political ◽

Evidence Based ◽

Spending Cuts ◽

Deep Recession ◽

The Eu

Fiscal policy is the sum of decisions on taxation and spending that one takes in an economy, particularly in times of crisis. As such, it is of existential importance in the life of a society. Known for its recent waves of spending cuts and tax increases (austerity) during recessions (Blyth, 2013), 2020 Europe has had a more expansionary fiscal policy than ever before. How do we make sense of this shift? To answer this question, let us draw on select insights from three political economy literatures on fiscal crisis management. The first is the literature on learning. For its proponents, changes in fiscal policy are powered by evidence-based, yet politically mediated cognitive updating in the corridors of power. Plainly put, policymakers are keen students of what changes in their environment. This literature has showed that a great deal of learning took place in the EU since 2010 in particular (Schmidt, 2020; Kahkhaji and Radaelli, 2017; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2019). Its main implication for fiscal policy under corona is that between 2010 and 2015 the EU leaders learned about the limits of austerity and the virtues of more spending and tax cuts in a recession. Consequently, one would expect that when a deep recession arrives again (and it did in the spring of 2020), they would not be tempted to do a rerun of the self-defeating policies of the 2010-2012 period. As Keynes put it, “when the facts change, I change my mind.”

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Crisis? What Crisis? EU Enlargement and the Political Economy of European Union Social Policy

Social Policy and Society ◽

10.1017/s1474746404002349 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 207-215 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Rob Sykes

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Political Economy ◽

Social Policy ◽

Turning Point ◽

Eu Enlargement ◽

The Political ◽

Social Strategies ◽

The Future ◽

The Eu

This article considers the character of EU social policy and in particular the linkages between the EU's economic and social strategies. Arguably, the most recent enlargement of the EU represents a turning point for the future of EU social policy, though there is disagreement about its future if not so much about the causes of this crisis. The article concludes that the future political economy of EU social policy and indeed of the EU itself may be subject to fundamental changes.

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The Political Economy of Interregional Relations: ASEAN and the EU * Alfredo C. Robles, Jr * Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, 200 pp. * ISBN 0 754 63557 0 (hb), US$94.45

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific ◽

10.1093/irap/lci121 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 6 (1) ◽

pp. 125-127

Author(s):

H. Dobson

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

The Political ◽

The Eu

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The Political Economy of the EU Approach to the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar

Politics and Governance ◽

10.17645/pag.v10i1.4678 ◽

2022 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Arlo Poletti ◽

Daniela Sicurelli

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Human Rights ◽

The Political ◽

Chinese Enterprises ◽

Trade Relations ◽

Choice Making ◽

Trade Sanctions ◽

The Government ◽

Trade Preferences ◽

The Eu

European institutions have repeatedly represented the EU as an actor that can use the attractiveness of its market to promote human rights internationally. From this perspective, EU trade sanctions represent a hard power tool to push the government of states accused of major human rights violations to abide by international law. In its reaction to the Rohingya crisis in 2018, despite the European Parliament’s call for the lifting of Myanmar’s trade preferences, the Council of the EU stated that it would rather tackle the problem by taking a “constructive approach” based on dialogue. We provide a political-economy explanation of this choice, making a plausible case that the political pressures from European importers and exporters, not to jeopardise trade relations with Myanmar, prevailed over the demands of European protectionist groups and NGOs advocating a tougher position. The firms interested in maintaining preferential trade relations with Myanmar were primarily motivated by a desire to avoid a disruption of trade and investment links within global value chains (GVCs) so that they could continue competing with Chinese enterprises.

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