scholarly journals Quantifying Brexit: from ex post to ex ante using structural gravity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Felbermayr ◽  
Jasmin Gröschl ◽  
Marina Steininger
Keyword(s):  
Economic Integration ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Trade Costs ◽  
Production Networks ◽  
Trade Model ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Substantial Heterogeneity

AbstractExploiting changes in the geography of economic integration in Europe, this paper quantifies the effects of Brexit from ex post to ex ante using structural gravity. By isolating the directional treatment effects of EU agreements for the UK, the analysis reveals important heterogeneity across agreements, sectors, and within pairs. We find that these directional effects matter for the size and distribution of the welfare effects of Brexit—the withdrawal of the UK from EU agreements resulting into a return of trade costs to the situation quo ante. We make this point with the help of a modern multi-sector trade model that is able to capture inter- and intranational production networks. In line with other papers, the welfare costs of Brexit are higher in the UK than in most other EU countries. However, heterogeneity tends to attenuate overall costs while giving rise to substantial heterogeneity between EU27 members and sectors. A scenario that could shift bargaining power eliminates asymmetries in the costs of Brexit as soon as the UK fully liberalizes its market.

Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 847-850 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARIA MONTERO ◽  
JUAN J. VIDAL-PUGA
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Morelli (1999) provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. We provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff; furthermore, there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves.

Ex ante and Ex post Subcontracting between Two Competing Bidders

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (01) ◽  
pp. 1950035
Author(s):  
Sijing Deng ◽  
Jiayan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Competitive Bidding ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Bid Price ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Capacity Constrained ◽  
Relative Capacity

We consider a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction between two capacity constrained bidders. Either bidder, due to the capacity constraint, is unable to fulfill the auctioned project from a buyer. We consider two formats of capacity cooperation between the two competing bidders: ex ante subcontracting and ex post subcontracting. In the former case, two bidders first bargain over the capacity cooperation contract and then compete with each other by bidding for the buyer’s project. In the latter case, two bidders first submit bids to the buyer and then bargain over the capacity cooperation contract. With ex ante or ex post subcontracting, two bidders have the so-called co-opetition relationship: they compete to win the auction but cooperate through subcontracting. We find that bidders’ subcontract timing has a fundamental impact on their competitive bidding behavior and profits. Both bidders will benefit from the ex ante subcontracting, and submit higher equilibrium bid prices, compared to the case without subcontracting. The ex post subcontracting, however, will lower the equilibrium bid price and may hurt the bidder with capacity advantage when bidders’ relative bargaining power is not consistent with the relative capacity advantage.

Risk-based Regulation in the UK: Courtroom Battles Expose Ongoing Problems

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Laurence BALL-KING
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Psychological Factors ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
Thought Processes ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Prior Risk ◽  
Shed Light

Since 1974, the UK has followed a risk-based approach to safety that, in the event of an incident, is enforced through the courts. The legislation is intentionally non-prescriptive and thus requires duty holders and the courts to decide what control measures were reasonable in the circumstances from ex ante and ex post positions. This has proved challenging for all parties involved. This paper describes a series of cases that have shed light on the thought processes of the courts. It appears that there is some variability in decision-making that can be attributed to several factors, including understanding of the word “risk”, the acceptability of residual risk and the validity of historical data as a means of measuring risk. In the aftermath of incidents, there is a real danger that psychological factors may intervene when the prior risk is being assessed for sentencing purposes. It is argued that while the risk-based model continues to enjoy widespread support in the UK and is not challenged, its implementation could be much eased by attention to details. This would serve to simplify courtroom debates, support those practising risk-based regulation and enable risks to be better prioritised.

scholarly journals Revisiting the Euro’s Trade Cost and Welfare Effects

2019 ◽  
Vol 239 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 917-956
Author(s):  
Gabriel Felbermayr ◽  
Marina Steininger
Keyword(s):  
European Monetary Union ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Gravity Modeling ◽  
Trade Cost ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Trade Effect ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
European Trade ◽  
Substantial Heterogeneity

Abstract When, about twenty years ago, the Euro was created, one objective was to facilitate intra-European trade by reducing transaction costs. Has the Euro delivered? Using sectoral trade data from 1995 to 2014 and applying structural gravity modeling, we conduct an ex post evaluation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In aggregate data, we find a significant average trade effect for goods of almost 8 percent, but a much smaller effect for services trade. Digging deeper, we detect substantial heterogeneity between sectors, as well as between and within country-pairs. Singling out Germany, and embedding the estimation results into a quantitative general equilibrium model of world trade, we find that EMU has increased real incomes in all EMU countries, albeit at different rates. E. g. incomes have increased by 0.3, 0.6, and 2.1 percent in Italy, Germany, and Luxembourg, respectively.

The Role of Decision Rights in Codevelopment Initiatives

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 832-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vishal Agrawal ◽  
Nektarios Oraiopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Value Chain ◽  
Operations Management ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Market Potential ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Decision Rights ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Problem definition: How should decision rights be allocated between firms occupying different positions in the value chain to maximize the value of a codevelopment project? Academic/practical relevance: We contribute to the operations management literature on the benefits and challenges of codevelopment initiatives by looking at the design of optimal governance structures that specify the allocation of rights to make certain decisions. Our problem is motivated by real-world challenges observed in codevelopment project initiation discussions between technology companies. Methodology: We utilize a game-theoretic model to study the allocation of the ex ante right to set the contract terms and the ex post right to choose which contract to implement, once the market potential is realized. Results: First, we find that delegating more control to a party does not necessarily imply that the party will be incentivized to exert greater effort. Specifically, we show that allocating both rights to the seller as opposed to only the ex ante right actually reduces the seller’s effort. Second, when the buyer has low bargaining power, the ex post decision right should be delegated to the seller, that is, the party with lower exposure to the effort-contingent outcome. Otherwise, the ex post decision right should be delegated to the buyer but the ex ante right should be held by the seller. Finally, we show that simple contracts with decision rights outperform a spot contract when the ex post bargaining power of one of the parties is substantially higher. Managerial implications: Our results offer insights for how managers should structure the optimal governance structure for codevelopment projects. We also identify when and how companies should delegate rights to their partners to maximize the value of the project. We show that the optimal governance structure depends crucially on the position in the value chain of the party with the higher bargaining power.

scholarly journals Sex and Selling: Agent Gender and Bargaining Power in the Resale Housing Market

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duong T. Pham ◽  
Geoffrey K. Turnbull ◽  
Bennie D. Waller
Keyword(s):  
Housing Market ◽  
Empirical Model ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Search Model ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Opposite Sex

AbstractThis paper uses a search model with Nash bargaining to identify various channels through which agent gender affects selling price and selling time in the resale market for houses. The theory is used in conjunction with the empirical model to infer agent bargaining power when dealing with the same or opposite sex agents on the other side of the transaction. The results reveal that sellers set higher listing prices when working with male agents, a pattern consistent with sellers’ ex ante beliefs that male agents enjoy greater expected bargaining power. Ex post agent bargaining power varies by sex and their role in the transaction. Female agents assisting buyers have stronger bargaining power when facing male listing agents than when facing female agents in rising or falling markets. The ex post bargaining power of male selling agents assisting buyers appears to be generally weaker than that of female listing agents.

Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Performance of Optimal REIT Portfolios

CFA Digest ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-9
Author(s):  
Ann C. Logue
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Erreurs de prévision ex ante et ex post

1993 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-138
Author(s):  
Pierre Malgrange ◽  
Silvia Mira d'Ercole
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante
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