scholarly journals Optimal Environmental Policy for a Mine Under Polluting Waste Rocks and Stock Pollution

2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pauli Lappi ◽  
Markku Ollikainen
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Waste Rocks ◽  
Optimal Environmental Policy

scholarly journals Aspects of the theory of environmental policy in developing countries

2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal ◽  
Hamid Beladi
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Dynamic Inconsistency ◽  
Pollution Taxes ◽  
Financing Constraint ◽  
Optimal Environmental Policy ◽  
Over Time

We study two issues relating to the conduct of environmental policy in developing countries (DCs). First, when faced with a self-financing constraint, should an environmental authority (EA) raise/lower pollution taxes over time or should it run a deficit/surplus? Second, given recent findings about the dynamic inconsistency of optimal environmental policy, should an EA make its preferences about the relative benefits of environmental protection versus production public, or should it keep its preferences private? Our analysis reveals that when faced with a self-financing constraint, it is optimal for the EA to run a deficit/surplus. Second, social losses are lower when this EA keeps its preferences private.

scholarly journals The Strategic Use of Innovation to Influence Environmental Policy: Taxes versus Standards

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 973-1000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Moner-Colonques ◽  
Santiago J. Rubio
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Policy ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Environmental Innovation ◽  
Emission Standard ◽  
Policy Game ◽  
Regulatory Commitment ◽  
Policy Games ◽  
Optimal Environmental Policy

Abstract This paper evaluates the strategic behavior of a polluting monopolist to influence environmental policy, either with taxes or with standards, comparing two alternative policy games. The first of the games assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. The second one is the time-consistent policy game. We find that the strategic behavior of the firm is welfare improving and leads to more environmental innovation than under regulatory commitment if a tax is used to control pollution. However, the contrary occurs if an emission standard is used. Under commitment, it is shown that both policy instruments are equivalent. We conclude that the optimal environmental policy is to use an emission tax since it yields the same welfare level than an emission standard for a committed regulator yet a larger welfare for a non-committed regulator.

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