Reframing the climate policy game

A key aim of climate policy is to progressively substitute renewables and energy efficiency for fossil fuel use. The associated rapid depreciation and replacement of fossil fuel-related physical and natural capital may entail a profound reorganisation of industry value chains, international trade, and geopolitics. Here, we present evidence confirming that the transformation of energy systems is well under way, and we explore the economic and strategic implications of the emerging energy geography. We show specifically that, given the economic implications of the ongoing energy transformation, the framing of climate policy as a prisoner’s dilemma is a poor description of strategic incentives. Instead, a new climate policy game emerges in which fossil fuel importers are better off decarbonising, competitive fossil fuel exporters are better off flooding markets, and uncompetitive fossil fuel producers – rather than benefitting from ‘free-riding’ – suffer from their exposure to stranded assets and lack of investment in decarbonisation technologies.

Emission taxes and feed-in subsidies in the regulation of a polluting monopoly

The paper studies the use of emission taxes and feed-in subsidies for the regulation of a monopoly that can produce the same good with a technology that employs a polluting input and a clean technology. In the first part of the paper, we show that the efficient solution can be implemented combining a tax on emissions and a subsidy on clean output. The tax is lower than the environmental damages, and the subsidy is equal to the difference between the price and the marginal revenue. In the second part of the paper, the second-best tax and subsidy are also calculated solving a two-stage policy game between the regulator and the monopoly with the regulator acting as the leader of the game. We find that the second-best tax rate can be the Pigouvian tax, but only if the marginal costs of the clean technology are constant. Using a linear–quadratic specification of the model, we show that the clean output is larger when a feed-in subsidy is used than when the tax is applied, but the dirty output can be larger or lower depending on the magnitude of marginal costs of the clean technology and marginal damages. The same occurs for the net social welfare, although we find that for low enough marginal costs of the clean technology, the net social welfare is larger when a feed-in subsidy is used to promote clean output regardless the importance of the marginal damages.

Stakeholder analysis in a policy game process in Tunisia

This paper discusses the policy game methodology and design that will be used in a simulation that aims to assess and understand the public health policy making in Tunisia. The policy game aims to analyzes the interactions, alliances and networks formed by the institutions and stakeholders during a policy game intervention that will be organized in Tunis, in which policy makers, civil servants, researchers and practitioners will simulate the use of evidence in real life policy making. The simulation has been realized within the Erasmus+ CONFIDE project focused on enhancing transnational partnerships and building capacity to inform evidence-based policies in Tunisia. This capacity building project and policy game is built on the collaboration of four Tunisian universities, from Tunis, Sfax, Sousse and Monastir, and three universities from the European Union, from Romania, Denmark and Slovakia. The policy game will focus on the drafting and implementation of a national strategy for fighting the increase of drug consumption among the Tunisian youth, a phenomenon which is rather new in Tunisia and spreading rapidly. The policy game will be followed by an analysis aiming to explore the impact of the intervention in enhancing cross-sector collaboration and the use of local stakeholder network regarding drug policy making. The preliminary results showed that the stakeholders approached this problem in a collaborative way and were willing to up-take evidence-based measures in the creation of a national strategy to fight drug consumption. This exercise has also shown that the policy game can be an effective tool in enhancing the use of scientific arguments in policy making and encourage stakeholders to approach policy making in a cross-sector way. Key messages Policy game can be an effective tool in enhancing the use of scientific arguments in policy making and encourage stakeholders to approach policy making in an interdisciplinary way. Stakeholders approached this problem in a collaborative way and were willing to up-take evidence-based measures in the creation of a national strategy to fight drug consumption.

Strengthening public health research capacity to inform evidence-based policies in Tunisia / CONFIDE

Introduction Over the past 15 years, Tunisia has experienced considerable development in the political and economic areas. In this context, important reforms in the field of public health have been made, with the Tunisian universities (University of Sfax, University of Tunis el Manar, University of Sousse) on their way to educate the public health professionals who can contribute to the modernization of the health system. Funded by the EC through Erasmus+ programme, the CONFIDE project (coordinated by Babes-Bolyai University, having European partners the Southern Denmark University and Trnava University) has 3 major objectives: develop Centres for Evidence into Health Policy (C4EHPs) designed to ease future collaborations; strengthen institutional capacity to deliver state-of-the-art research into policy training program; consolidate national and local partnerships between the public health academic and non-academic sector. The progress The partners have jointly contributed to the following activities: development of the Centre for Evidence into Public Health Policy, 3 train-the-trainer sessions, 9 train-the-trainees sessions, internships for trainees, one policy game. To this date, 18 trainers have been trained by European partner universities and they trained 29 Tunisian trainees in the field of public health research, health promotion and evidence-based public health policy. The trainees will participate in internships in local and regional health institutions, to practice what they have learned. A policy game will be organized, to simulate collaboration between researchers and policy makers, for public health policy elaboration. Conclusions The Research into Policy training program has been implemented in all 3 Tunisian partner universities. The expected long-term changes are: young workforce trained into public health and evidence-based policies fields; university curricula modifications by introducing public health courses and developing of Masters of Public Health.

Sustainability Indicators: Monitoring Cross-County Water Cooperation in the Nzoia River Basin, Kenya

Kenya Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB) Impact Report indicates a stagnation in water coverage at 55 percent, for the last three years, contrary to the 2015 target of 80 percent. One main reason for the stagnation is weak cross-county cooperation between hydrologically interdependent governments. WASREB has little guidance on what indicators to use to enhance cross-county water cooperation. Through literature review, we assess whether the UN-Water methodology for assessing Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 6.5.2 would provide useful guidelines. Based on the literature review outcomes, we design a water policy game known as Nzoia WeShareIt. After that, we play seven-game sessions in four county governments (Busia, Bungoma, Kakamega, and Trans Nzoia), on 11–22 July 2016. We use the in-game and post-game questionnaire data to measure learning outcomes on interdependence and cooperation. The findings indicate that Nzoia WeShareIt policy game as a form of experiential learning increased understanding on the value of cross-county cooperation. The study constitutes a practical guideline to WASREB and a quick reference tool to be explored when designing indicators to monitor cross-county cooperation. We also propose a mixed method approach that incorporates team interdependence indicators as distinct and separate indicators from cooperation. Moreover, we recommend strengthening SDG 6.5.2 indicator to measure transboundary water cooperation inputs, processes and outcomes.