Dynamic Inconsistency-aware DeepFake Video Detection

The spread of DeepFake videos causes a serious threat to information security, calling for effective detection methods to distinguish them. However, the performance of recent frame-based detection methods become limited due to their ignorance of the inter-frame inconsistency of fake videos. In this paper, we propose a novel Dynamic Inconsistency-aware Network to handle the inconsistent problem, which uses a Cross-Reference module (CRM) to capture both the global and local inter-frame inconsistencies. The CRM contains two parallel branches. The first branch takes faces from adjacent frames as input, and calculates a structure similarity map for a global inconsistency representation. The second branch only focuses on the inter-frame variation of independent critical regions, which captures the local inconsistency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to totally use the inter-frame inconsistency information from the global and local perspectives. Compared with existing methods, our model provides a more accurate and robust detection on FaceForensics++, DFDC-preview and Celeb-DFv2 datasets.

Revealing Naïveté and Sophistication from Procrastination and Preproperation

This paper proposes a novel way of distinguishing whether a person is naïve or sophisticated about her own dynamic inconsistency using only her task-completion behavior. It shows that adding an unused extra opportunity to complete a task can lead a naïve (but not a sophisticated) person to complete it later and can lead a sophisticated (but not a naïve) person to complete the task earlier. These results provide a framework for revealing preference and sophistication types from behavior in a general environment that includes that of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). (JEL D15, D91)

Multiple Beliefs, Dominance and Dynamic Consistency

This paper investigates multiperiod decisions under multiple beliefs. We explore the dynamic consistency of both complete and incomplete orderings. We focus on a dominance concept that supports decision-making under multiple characterizations of uncertainty by ruling out strategies that are dominated across a set of beliefs. We uncover a distinction between two types of dynamic inconsistency, which we label fallacious and fallible inconsistency. Fallacious inconsistency occurs when an a priori optimal strategy is suboptimal in the second period, thus requiring the decision-maker to depart from the original strategy. Fallible inconsistency occurs when an a priori suboptimal second-period action ceases being suboptimal from the perspective of the second-period preferences. We introduce corresponding definitions of dynamic consistency and show that the two types of consistency are equivalent for complete orderings, but differ for incomplete orderings. Subjective expected utility is dynamically consistent and non-expected-utility decision rules, such as minmax, are not. We show that the dominance relation over beliefs falls between these two: it is immune to the more severe fallacious inconsistency, but not to the less problematic fallible inconsistency. We illustrate the method and concepts using a numerical example addressing a focal, real-world problem of risk and ambiguity regarding climate change. This paper was accepted by Ilia Tsetlin, decision analysis.

Dynamic Inconsistency and Incentive Design: Insights from Behavioural Economics for HR Managers

Behavioural economics is a thriving field that offers descriptive models of human decision-making that deviate from the standard model of decision-making in economics. This article presents insights from behavioural economics that can help address dynamic inconsistency, that is, time-inconsistency problems of employees and inform incentive design strategies. The author argues that lessons from behavioural economics can be applied to design solutions that can transform HR practices. HR managers and leaders stand to benefit from the emerging evidence from the lab and field in behavioural economics that calls for a rethinking of the conventional understanding of human behaviour.

An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion

A sender ranks information structures knowing that a receiver processes the information before choosing an action affecting them both. The sender and receiver may differ in their utility functions and/or prior beliefs, yielding a model of dynamic inconsistency when they represent the same individual at two points in time. I take as primitive (i) a collection of preference orderings over all information structures, indexed by menus of acts (the sender's ex ante preferences for information), and (ii) a collection of correspondences over menus of acts, indexed by signals (the receiver's signal‐contingent choice(s) from menus). I provide axiomatic representation theorems characterizing the sender as a sophisticated planner and the receiver as a Bayesian information processor, and show that all parameters can be uniquely identified from the sender's preferences for information. I also establish a series of results characterizing common priors, common utility functions, and intuitive measures of disagreement for these parameters—all in terms of the sender's preferences for information.

Inflation targeting: From “constrained discretion” to singularity

In recent years, inflation targeting has become a staple of international monetary policy. The paper considers different challenges this monetary policy regime faces with regard to suppressed inflation, attaining the zero lower bound on the policy interest rates, and committing central banks to simultaneously pursue additional objectives such as financial stability. Inflation targeting has proved inefficient in raising inflation to the target zone from below, and unorthodox monetary policy tools have not proved their validity in this regard yet. As a result, monetary authorities are more inclined to discretion allowing them to compromise different aspects of “pure” inflation targeting. The value of this discretion is based on asymmetric information and boosted by additional functions assumed by central banks. However, it might bring about serious problems of dynamic inconsistency, compounded political uncertainty, and bureaucratic misconduct. Since none of the alternatives to inflation targeting currently looks fully satisfactory, it is concluded that the inflation targeting regime should be transformed to take into account the current situation, but a necessary precondition for the effectiveness of the new regime is enhanced accountability of central banks.

Shaping public confidence as a way to overcome a liquidity trap

In the aftermath of 2007—2009 global financial crisis, many economies had stuck in a liquidity trap. This stance forced central banks to implement various unconventional monetary policies, including massive purchases of financial assets, cutting policy rates down into the negative zone and reliance on forward guidance. In this paper we critically discuss these policy measures. Unconventional policy success in overcoming a liquidity trap heavily depends on the ability to manage private agents’ expectations. If the central bank is capable to form expectations of low interest rates for a prolonged period after the escape from a liquidity trap, unconventional monetary policies lead to a recovery. Another crucial issue is dynamic inconsistency of prolonged low interest rate policy. We discuss several ways of how the central bank can commit not to lift policy rate up to keep inflation unnecessary low. The problem of dynamic inconsistency, which complicates the formation of such expectations, is also considered, and possible ways of solving this problem are discussed.