Endangered Species and Optimal Environmental Policy

1996 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Fredman ◽  
Mattias Boman
2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal ◽  
Hamid Beladi

We study two issues relating to the conduct of environmental policy in developing countries (DCs). First, when faced with a self-financing constraint, should an environmental authority (EA) raise/lower pollution taxes over time or should it run a deficit/surplus? Second, given recent findings about the dynamic inconsistency of optimal environmental policy, should an EA make its preferences about the relative benefits of environmental protection versus production public, or should it keep its preferences private? Our analysis reveals that when faced with a self-financing constraint, it is optimal for the EA to run a deficit/surplus. Second, social losses are lower when this EA keeps its preferences private.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 973-1000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Moner-Colonques ◽  
Santiago J. Rubio

Abstract This paper evaluates the strategic behavior of a polluting monopolist to influence environmental policy, either with taxes or with standards, comparing two alternative policy games. The first of the games assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. The second one is the time-consistent policy game. We find that the strategic behavior of the firm is welfare improving and leads to more environmental innovation than under regulatory commitment if a tax is used to control pollution. However, the contrary occurs if an emission standard is used. Under commitment, it is shown that both policy instruments are equivalent. We conclude that the optimal environmental policy is to use an emission tax since it yields the same welfare level than an emission standard for a committed regulator yet a larger welfare for a non-committed regulator.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 32-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Epstein

Endangered species protection represents one of the most enduring paradigms of global environmental governance. From a localized concept rooted in North American conceptions of nature, it evolved over the first half of the 20th century into a norm shaping inter-state behavior. This article analyzes the making of endangered species protection as the first global environmental norm, within a broadly constructivist framework. The central concern is how the “making of” the norm impacted its becoming; and how it continues to determine the current orientation of global environmental policy-making. Three enduring legacies are explored. First, the norm was essentially “made in the North” and for the North. A genealogy of the norm thus brings into sharp relief the North-South tensions that have developed as the norm was extended onto a global level. Second, the article highlights the divide between conservationists and preservationists, which continues to plague much policy-making today, as it leads to conflicting visions of global environmental well-being. In a genealogical perspective, this split appears constitutive of the norm itself, and no closer to being resolved. Third, the article examines the targeted single-species approach that was first ushered in by the norm, and has become entrenched as a template for global environmental policy-making at large. There the article asks whether the norm has in fact precluded the passage to more comprehensive, ecosystemic approaches in the making of global environmental policies. Throughout the discussion the whaling issue takes center stage, because of its role in the emergence of the norm, and because of the way it continues to capture recent developments in global environmental politics.


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