Game theoretic analysis of a three-stage interconnected forward and reverse supply chain

After-sales service contract is widely popular in business. Although both the cases of manufacturer offering warranty and retailer offering warranty are common in market, the differences between them have been few studied. In this paper, we build a two-echelon supply chain in which a manufacturer produces limit quality products and sells them to a retailer. To promote sales, the manufacturer or retailer offers a free-replacement warranty to the customers. Customer’s demand is affected by the warranty length. We investigate the game relationships between the supply chain members. We find that the warranty length negatively relates to the product quality in both the manufacturer offering warranty case and the retailer offering warranty case. When retailer’s profit margin is not low, the retailer offers a longer warranty than the manufacturer and vice versa. Profit of the supply chain is also analyzed along with a numerical study.

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A game-theoretic analysis of the government's role on the biomass supply chain construction

International Journal of Ambient Energy ◽

10.1080/01430750.2016.1144526 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 38 (5) ◽

pp. 444-458 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Mingling Zhai ◽

Xu Zhang ◽

Fei Cheng ◽

Xiang Zhou ◽

Xing Su

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Biomass Supply ◽

Game Theoretic

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Game-Theoretic Analysis of Pricing Models in a Dyadic Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences ◽

10.4018/ijsds.2019040101 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 10 (2) ◽

pp. 1-24 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Abhishek Sharma

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Channel Coordination ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Nash Game ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Pricing Decisions ◽

Fairness Concerns ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Fairness Concern

The existing studies on fairness in channel coordination assume markets as the group of oligopolies in which a few firms dominate, scant evidence has been provided where fairness concerns are investigated for a market scenario where all firms share equal dominance. This article considers a dyadic supply chain composed of one fair-minded manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer and investigate their pricing decisions under two different non-cooperative game-theoretic frameworks: manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and Vertical Nash game and provide a comparative analysis. The results show that the prices of the Stackelberg game model are always higher than that of the corresponding prices of the Vertical Nash game. We also find that the prices gap between the two models decreases with the retailer's fairness concern, and is uncertain with respect to manufacturer's fairness. In addition, the manufacturer's (retailer's) profit in the Stackelberg game is decreasing (increasing) in its own fairness and is uncertain in the Vertical Nash game. Furthermore, findings are illustrated through a numerical example.

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