Game-Theoretic Analysis of Pricing Models in a Dyadic Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Fairness Concern

The existing studies on fairness in channel coordination assume markets as the group of oligopolies in which a few firms dominate, scant evidence has been provided where fairness concerns are investigated for a market scenario where all firms share equal dominance. This article considers a dyadic supply chain composed of one fair-minded manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer and investigate their pricing decisions under two different non-cooperative game-theoretic frameworks: manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and Vertical Nash game and provide a comparative analysis. The results show that the prices of the Stackelberg game model are always higher than that of the corresponding prices of the Vertical Nash game. We also find that the prices gap between the two models decreases with the retailer's fairness concern, and is uncertain with respect to manufacturer's fairness. In addition, the manufacturer's (retailer's) profit in the Stackelberg game is decreasing (increasing) in its own fairness and is uncertain in the Vertical Nash game. Furthermore, findings are illustrated through a numerical example.

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Green Supply Chain Under Cost-Sharing Contract with Fairness Concerns

2020 ◽  
pp. 2050017
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sharma ◽  
Deepika Jain
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Fairness Concern

This study investigates the fairness concerned behavior of the supply chain members in a dyadic supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer, wherein the manufacturer puts efforts for improving the product’s greening level and sells it to the customers through the retailer. Through manufacturer-led and retailer-led Stackelberg game frameworks, the study presents two models- one in which only the manufacturer exhibits advantageous inequity averse behavior and the other in which only the retailer exhibits them. The results demonstrate the following findings: (1) the manufacturer’s profit is decreasing while product’s greening level, retailer’s and total supply chain’s profits are increasing and manufacturer’s wholesale price and retailer’s market price are nonmonotone in manufacturer’s fairness concern, (2) the wholesale price, product’s greening level, manufacturer’s profit, and total supply chain’s profit are increasing while retailer’s profit is decreasing and market price is nonmonotone in retailer’s fairness concern. In addition, the study examines the optimality of cost-sharing contract for different ranges of the model parameters. Furthermore, the findings are elucidated through the numerical analysis and managerial insights are generated.

scholarly journals Game Theoretic Analysis of After-Sales Service in Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Warranty Sensitive Demand

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yuqing Qi ◽  
Jing Wu ◽  
Tiandongjie Zhao ◽  
Yuling Sun ◽  
Bin Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Profit Margin ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Service Contract ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Free Replacement ◽  
Warranty Length

After-sales service contract is widely popular in business. Although both the cases of manufacturer offering warranty and retailer offering warranty are common in market, the differences between them have been few studied. In this paper, we build a two-echelon supply chain in which a manufacturer produces limit quality products and sells them to a retailer. To promote sales, the manufacturer or retailer offers a free-replacement warranty to the customers. Customer’s demand is affected by the warranty length. We investigate the game relationships between the supply chain members. We find that the warranty length negatively relates to the product quality in both the manufacturer offering warranty case and the retailer offering warranty case. When retailer’s profit margin is not low, the retailer offers a longer warranty than the manufacturer and vice versa. Profit of the supply chain is also analyzed along with a numerical study.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Reverse Supply Chains Considering Fairness Concern

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. 1657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Di Wu ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Ruyu Yan ◽  
Ruijun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Transfer Price ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Offline Channels

The fierce competition in the recycling industry and the rapid development of internet technology has prompted recycling centers to develop a dual-channel reverse supply chain with both offline and online recycling channels. After the introduction of online channels, recycling centers and third-party recyclers (TPR) have paid attention to the division of profits in supply chain systems and the behavior of fairness concerns. Therefore, it is necessary to help recycling enterprises make pricing decisions in consideration of fairness concerns. This paper is aimed at answering the following two main questions: (1) When the recycling center or TPR have fairness concerns, how does the optimal pricing and revenue of supply chain members change when both sides are neutral? (2) When the fairness concern coefficient changes, how does the overall revenue of the supply chain system change? How should supply chain members adjust their pricing decisions to maximize their own profits? In order to solve the above problems, Stackelberg game models were made from three aspects: both sides are neutral, only the TPR has fairness concerns, and only the recycling center has fairness concerns. Based on the results of the example analyses for the model, we found that when only the TPR has fairness concerns, the profit of the recycling center and the transfer price of offline channels will decrease, while the profit of TPR is the opposite. Furthermore, when only a recycling center has fairness concerns, it will lead to the reduction of not only the recycling price and transfer price of offline channels, but also the profits of the entire supply chain system. Specially, whether it is for a recycling center or TPR, a lower level of fairness concern coefficient has a stronger impact on pricing and revenue than at high levels.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

A game-theoretic analysis of the government's role on the biomass supply chain construction

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 444-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingling Zhai ◽  
Xu Zhang ◽  
Fei Cheng ◽  
Xiang Zhou ◽  
Xing Su
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Biomass Supply ◽  
Game Theoretic
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