Naturalness is Not an Aim of Belief

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Hall
Keyword(s):  
Aim Of Belief

WIARA A INNE TYPY POZNANIA

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 69-81
Author(s):  
Marcin SIEŃKOWSK
Keyword(s):  
Religious Faith ◽  
Knowledge Of God ◽  
Types Of Knowledge ◽  
Aim Of Belief ◽  
Union With God

The characteristics of the knowledge of God through the religion faith is consequence of subject– that one’s overtopped the epistemic powers of human – which is accessible merely in that way.The aim of Belief is supernatural and it consists in union with God through getting to know hisnature. The method of the religious faith is an engagement of the intellect and a will the recognisedsubject. The religious faith is a different cognition toward other types of knowledge. It is also thecognition which assumes a former natural acquired knowledge. A leap of faith in that what wasdeemed for truth needs activities of intellect.

Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate Nolfi
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Aim Of Belief ◽  
The Way

At least when we restrict our attention to the epistemic domain, it seems clear that only considerations which bear on whether p can render a subject’s belief that p epistemically justified, by constituting the reasons on the basis of which she believes that p. And we ought to expect any account of epistemic normativity to explain why this is so. Extant accounts generally appeal to the idea that belief aims at truth, in an effort to explain why there is a kind of evidential constraint on the sorts of considerations that can be epistemic reasons. However, there are grounds for doubting that belief, in fact, aims at truth in the way that these accounts propose. This chapter develops an alternative explanation of why it is that non-evidential considerations cannot be epistemic reasons by taking seriously the idea that the constitutive aim of belief is fundamentally action-oriented.

scholarly journals Understanding and Structure

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Hazlett
Keyword(s):  
Socially Constructed ◽  
Aim Of Belief ◽  
Intellectual Achievement ◽  
Explanatory Structure

This chapter explores two claims about metaphysical structure: that “carving nature at the joints” is a valuable intellectual achievement and that understanding is constituted by a “grasp” of explanatory structure, and the following claim about their relationship is defended: explanatory understanding requires “carving nature at the joints.” The existence of explanatory connections, to be “grasped” in understanding, requires the existence of natural “joints,” which must be represented in understanding. However, neither “carving nature at the joints” nor understanding is plausibly seen as “the aim of belief” or the “the aim of inquiry.” The chapter concludes with a discussion of the metaphysical preconditions for explanatory understanding through a discussion of the role of socially constructed properties in explanations: despite beign in some sense “non-natural,” such properties are real enough to ground the possibility of explanatory understanding. The fact that explanatory understanding requires “carving nature at the joints” therefore does not preclude the possibility of understanding in disciplines whose subject matters are plausibly understood as comprising socially constructed properties.

Intention

2020 ◽  
pp. 177-215
Author(s):  
John Brunero
Keyword(s):  
Alternative View ◽  
Job Descriptions ◽  
Rational Requirements ◽  
Aim Of Belief ◽  
Carry Over

This chapter develops a view according to which there is a constitutive aim of intention that parallels the constitutive aim of belief, and both of these constitutive aims can be used to explain some of the rational requirements governing intentions and beliefs. The chapter first considers in what sense there is an “aim of intention.” It begins by looking at many of the philosophical ideas associated with the “aim of belief,” noting that some of these won’t easily carry over to the “aim of intention” in the relevant way. However, if we understand constitutive aims in terms of the “job descriptions” of attitudes, there is room for optimism here. It then considers how the constitutive aims might explain certain consistency and coherence requirements, including means–ends coherence. The chapter critiques Michael Bratman’s suggestions for how these explanations might go, and offers an alternative view, which it calls “Non-normative Disjunctivism.”

Truth and the Aim of Belief

Philosophy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Fassio
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Aim Of Belief ◽  
Normative Dimension ◽  
At Will

With the claim that “belief aims at truth,” philosophers designate a specific feature of belief according to which believing a proposition carries with it some sort of commitment or teleological directedness toward the truth of the believed proposition. The hypothesis that beliefs involve an aim at truth has been used by philosophers to explain a number of features specific to this type of mental state, such as the impossibility of believing at will, the absurdity of asserting Moorean sentences (e.g., “I believe that it is raining, but it is not raining”), and the normative dimension of evidential considerations in the processes of belief-formation. Many consider aiming at truth constitutive of belief, individuating belief as that type of mental state and distinguishing beliefs from other mental attitudes. In the contemporary debate there is disagreement over how to interpret the claim that belief aims at truth. Different accounts of the aim have been suggested in normative, teleological, and minimalist terms. Some philosophers even deny that beliefs involve an aim in any interesting sense. A view that has recently gained popularity is that beliefs do not aim at mere truth, but at knowledge. Although the two issues may be related, questions about the aim of belief must be distinguished from questions concerning whether having true beliefs is valuable, and whether truth is the ultimate goal of inquiry.

The Aim of Belief

2015 ◽  
Vol 65 (261) ◽  
pp. 839-842
Author(s):  
Dean H. Chapman
Keyword(s):  
Aim Of Belief

scholarly journals To believe is to believe true

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-136
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Contingent Fact ◽  
Counter Example ◽  
Analytic Truth ◽  
Aim Of Belief

It is argued that to believe is to believe true. That is, when one believes a proposition  one thereby believes the proposition to be true. This is a point about what it is to believe  rather than about the aim of belief or the standard of correctness for belief. The point that  to believe is to believe true appears to be an analytic truth about the concept of belief. It  also appears to be essential to the state of belief that to believe is to believe true. This is  not just a contingent fact about our ordinary psychology, since even a non-ordinary believer  must believe a proposition that they believe to be true. Nor is the idea that one may accept a  theory as empirically adequate rather than as true a counter-example, since such acceptance  combines belief in the truth of the observational claims of a theory with suspension of belief  with respect to the non-observational claims of a theory. Nor is the fact that to believe is to  believe true to be explained in terms of an inference governed by the T-scheme from the belief  that P to the belief that P is true, since there is no inference from the former to the latter. To believe that P just is to believe that P is true.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document