scholarly journals Language and Theory of Mind in Autism Spectrum Disorder: The Relationship Between Complement Syntax and False Belief Task Performance

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 929-937 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie E. Lind ◽  
Dermot M. Bowler
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Steven Den-Kaat

<p>The individual differences in imagination ability in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) were tested in a sample of 14 children with ASD and 14 matched typically developing (TD) children. Analysis was conducted on the extent of imagination in symbolic pretend play and impossible entity drawings. Aside from difficulties with imagination, children with ASD showed significant group deficits in executive function (generativity, visuospatial planning and cognitive flexibility) and false belief theory of mind understanding. Amongst children with ASD, executive function abilities (generativity and visuospatial planning) related to imaginative play and drawings. In contrast, amongst participants in the TD group, a mixture of both executive function (cognitive flexibility) and false belief theory of mind understanding predicted imaginative ability. These results are discussed in terms of how executive control plays a broad and important role in imaginative ability across groups, but the contributions appear to be expressed and routed differently in ASD. The discussion also highlights the theoretical implications of not having theory of mind that underpin imagination in ASD.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie Glenwright ◽  
Rose M. Scott ◽  
Elena Bilevicius ◽  
Megan Pronovost ◽  
Ana Hanlon-Dearman

An established body of literature indicates that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have difficulty understanding figurative language due to a deficit in theory of mind, or the ability to consider the beliefs of other people. Children with ASD tend to similarly fail traditional theory of mind tasks, which assess their ability to represent false beliefs. Our claim is, however, that these tasks involve cognitive processing demands that might mask false belief understanding because they require elicited responses. We examined whether children with ASD demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with a spontaneous-response false belief task that measures children’s eye gaze durations. The two child participant groups were composed of 20 males with ASD (aged 3–9 years) and 20 typically developing males (aged 2–5 years) who were individually matched according to verbal mental age. Children with ASD and typically developing children listened to a change-of-location story accompanied by a book with matching and non-matching pictures. The final page showed the character searching for her object in a location that was either consistent or inconsistent with her belief. Both groups of children looked reliably longer at the belief-consistent picture, regardless of whether the character’s belief was true or false, though children with ASD were slower to do so. We suggest that a spontaneous-response assessment technique can potentially reveal figurative language comprehension in children with ASD in future research.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Steven Den-Kaat

<p>The individual differences in imagination ability in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) were tested in a sample of 14 children with ASD and 14 matched typically developing (TD) children. Analysis was conducted on the extent of imagination in symbolic pretend play and impossible entity drawings. Aside from difficulties with imagination, children with ASD showed significant group deficits in executive function (generativity, visuospatial planning and cognitive flexibility) and false belief theory of mind understanding. Amongst children with ASD, executive function abilities (generativity and visuospatial planning) related to imaginative play and drawings. In contrast, amongst participants in the TD group, a mixture of both executive function (cognitive flexibility) and false belief theory of mind understanding predicted imaginative ability. These results are discussed in terms of how executive control plays a broad and important role in imaginative ability across groups, but the contributions appear to be expressed and routed differently in ASD. The discussion also highlights the theoretical implications of not having theory of mind that underpin imagination in ASD.</p>


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren Bishop-Fitzpatrick ◽  
Carla A. Mazefsky ◽  
Nancy J. Minshew ◽  
Shaun M. Eack

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