scholarly journals Cognitive Underpinnings of Symbolic Pretend Play and Impossible Entity Drawings:  Imaginative Ability in Typical Development and Autism Spectrum Disorder

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Steven Den-Kaat

<p>The individual differences in imagination ability in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) were tested in a sample of 14 children with ASD and 14 matched typically developing (TD) children. Analysis was conducted on the extent of imagination in symbolic pretend play and impossible entity drawings. Aside from difficulties with imagination, children with ASD showed significant group deficits in executive function (generativity, visuospatial planning and cognitive flexibility) and false belief theory of mind understanding. Amongst children with ASD, executive function abilities (generativity and visuospatial planning) related to imaginative play and drawings. In contrast, amongst participants in the TD group, a mixture of both executive function (cognitive flexibility) and false belief theory of mind understanding predicted imaginative ability. These results are discussed in terms of how executive control plays a broad and important role in imaginative ability across groups, but the contributions appear to be expressed and routed differently in ASD. The discussion also highlights the theoretical implications of not having theory of mind that underpin imagination in ASD.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Steven Den-Kaat

<p>The individual differences in imagination ability in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) were tested in a sample of 14 children with ASD and 14 matched typically developing (TD) children. Analysis was conducted on the extent of imagination in symbolic pretend play and impossible entity drawings. Aside from difficulties with imagination, children with ASD showed significant group deficits in executive function (generativity, visuospatial planning and cognitive flexibility) and false belief theory of mind understanding. Amongst children with ASD, executive function abilities (generativity and visuospatial planning) related to imaginative play and drawings. In contrast, amongst participants in the TD group, a mixture of both executive function (cognitive flexibility) and false belief theory of mind understanding predicted imaginative ability. These results are discussed in terms of how executive control plays a broad and important role in imaginative ability across groups, but the contributions appear to be expressed and routed differently in ASD. The discussion also highlights the theoretical implications of not having theory of mind that underpin imagination in ASD.</p>


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping-Chen Chan ◽  
Cheng-Te Chen ◽  
Hua Feng ◽  
Ya-Chen Lee ◽  
Kuan-Lin Chen

Objective/Background This study aimed to examine the relationships of theory of mind (ToM) to both pretend play and playfulness in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Methods Twenty children with ASD aged between 3 years and 7.11 years were assessed with the ToM test, and then placed in a free play condition and a pretend play condition to assess pretend play and playfulness with the Child-Initiated Pretend Play Assessment and Test of Playfulness, respectively. In addition, the children's symptom severities of ASD and verbal abilities were also assessed with the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) and Receptive and Expressive Vocabulary Test—second edition, respectively. Results The results of the regression analysis confirmed that ToM significantly predicted pretend play variables, namely, Number of Object Substitutions (R2 = .158, p = .002) and Number of Imitated Actions (R2 = .175, p = .001), but not playfulness. The CARS score was a significant predictor of the Percentage of Elaborate Pretend Play Actions of pretend play (R2 = .075, p = .034), as well as the internal control (R2 = .125, p = .006) and framing (R2 = .071, p = .039) variables of playfulness. Conclusion The findings support the idea that children with ASD who have better ToM might be able to develop better pretend play, but not better playfulness, which might be more strongly related to their autistic severity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie Glenwright ◽  
Rose M. Scott ◽  
Elena Bilevicius ◽  
Megan Pronovost ◽  
Ana Hanlon-Dearman

An established body of literature indicates that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have difficulty understanding figurative language due to a deficit in theory of mind, or the ability to consider the beliefs of other people. Children with ASD tend to similarly fail traditional theory of mind tasks, which assess their ability to represent false beliefs. Our claim is, however, that these tasks involve cognitive processing demands that might mask false belief understanding because they require elicited responses. We examined whether children with ASD demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with a spontaneous-response false belief task that measures children’s eye gaze durations. The two child participant groups were composed of 20 males with ASD (aged 3–9 years) and 20 typically developing males (aged 2–5 years) who were individually matched according to verbal mental age. Children with ASD and typically developing children listened to a change-of-location story accompanied by a book with matching and non-matching pictures. The final page showed the character searching for her object in a location that was either consistent or inconsistent with her belief. Both groups of children looked reliably longer at the belief-consistent picture, regardless of whether the character’s belief was true or false, though children with ASD were slower to do so. We suggest that a spontaneous-response assessment technique can potentially reveal figurative language comprehension in children with ASD in future research.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (02) ◽  
pp. 541-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evangelia-Chrysanthi Kouklari ◽  
Stella Tsermentseli ◽  
Claire P. Monks

AbstractThe development of executive function (EF) in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has been investigated using only “cool”-cognitive EF tasks while there is limited knowledge regarding the development of “hot”-affective EF. Although cool EF development and its links to theory of mind (ToM) have been widely examined, understanding of the influence of hot EF to ToM mechanisms is minimal. The present study introduced a longitudinal design to examine the developmental changes in cool and hot EF of children with ASD (n = 45) and matched (to age and IQ) controls (n = 37) as well as the impact of EF on ToM development over a school year. For children with ASD, although selective cool (working memory and inhibition) and hot (affective decision making) EF domains presented age-related improvements, they never reached the performance level of the control group. Early cool working memory predicted later ToM in both groups but early hot delay discounting predicted later ToM only in the ASD group. No evidence was found for the reverse pattern (early ToM predicting later EF). These findings suggest that improvements in some EF aspects are evident in school age in ASD and highlight the crucial role that both cool and hot EF play in ToM development.


Author(s):  
Alice M. Hammel ◽  
Ryan M. Hourigan

One of the most unique attributes of students with autism is the distinct way they think. This chapter sheds light on the cognitive world of students with autism in the music classroom. The following topics are included: theory of mind; central coherence; executive function; joint attention (and cognition); and music cognition and students with autism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 265-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathalie Berard ◽  
Lynn Loutzenhiser ◽  
Phillip R. Sevigny ◽  
Dennis P. Alfano

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is an aetiologically complex neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by deficits in social functioning. Children with ASD display a wide range of social competence and more variability in social domains as compared with either communication or repetitive behaviour domains. There is limited understanding of factors that contribute to the heterogeneity of social abilities in ASD. A modified version of McKown and colleagues’ social competence model was used to examine social competence in 49 8- to 13-year-old boys with ASD without cognitive disability. The relations between executive function (EF), social emotional learning (SEL), and parent reports of child social competence were examined. Results showed that EF but not SEL predicted parent-reported child social competence. Although many interventions target SEL skills, these findings support specifically targeting EF in both assessment and interventions of school-aged children with ASD.


2015 ◽  
Vol 207 (5) ◽  
pp. 392-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Carter Leno ◽  
Tony Charman ◽  
Andrew Pickles ◽  
Catherine R. G. Jones ◽  
Gillian Baird ◽  
...  

BackgroundPeople with callous–unemotional traits and also those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) display sociocognitive difficulties. However, the frequency and neurocognitive correlates of callous–unemotional traits within individuals with ASD are unknown.AimsTo determine the prevalence of callous–unemotional traits in individuals with ASD and test their association with behavioural and cognitive measures.MethodParents of 92 adolescents with ASD completed the Antisocial Processes Screening Device (APSD) for callous–unemotional traits. Adolescents participated in tasks of emotion recognition, theory of mind and cognitive flexibility.ResultsIn total 51% (n = 47) scored above a cut-off expected to identify the top 6% on the APSD. Of these 17% (n = 8) had concurrent conduct problems. Regression analyses found callous–unemotional traits were associated with specific impairment in fear recognition but not with theory of mind or cognitive flexibility.ConclusionsAdolescents with ASD show high rates of callous–unemotional traits but, unlike in the general population, these are not strongly associated with conduct problems. The relationship of callous–unemotional traits to impairments in fear recognition suggests similar affective difficulties as in individuals with callous–unemotional traits without ASD.


Languages ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Maria Andreou ◽  
Ianthi Maria Tsimpli ◽  
Stephanie Durrleman ◽  
Eleni Peristeri

Impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM) are a core feature of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). ToM may be enhanced by various factors, including bilingualism, executive functions (EF), and complex syntax. This work investigates the language-cognition interface in ASD by exploring whether ToM can be enhanced by bilingualism, whether such ToM boosts would be due to EF or syntax, and whether routes to mentalizing would differ between bilinguals and monolinguals on the spectrum. Twenty-seven monolingual Greek-speaking and twenty-nine bilingual Albanian-Greek children with ASD were tested on ToM reasoning in verbal and low-verbal ToM tasks, an executive function 2-back task, and a sentence repetition task. Results revealed that bilingual children with ASD performed better than monolinguals with ASD in the low-verbal ToM and the 2-back tasks. In the sentence repetition task, bilinguals scored higher than monolinguals in complex sentences, and specifically in adverbials and relatives. Regarding the relations between ToM, EF, and sentence repetition, the monolingual group’s performance in the verbal ToM tasks was associated with complement syntax, whereas, for the bilingual children with ASD, performance in both verbal and low-verbal ToM tasks was associated with EF and adverbial clause repetition. The overall pattern of results suggests that mentalizing may follow distinct pathways across the two groups.


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