Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment in a Mixed Duopoly with Relative Profit-Maximizers

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 323-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasuhiko Nakamura
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Strategic Commitment ◽  
Relative Profit

scholarly journals Complex Dynamics in a Mixed Duopoly Game Based on Relative Profit Maximization

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-57
Author(s):  
Yuqi Dou ◽  
Xingyu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Systems ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Rational Expectation ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Complex Dynamic ◽  
Discrete Dynamic Systems ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Relative Profit

In this paper, the complex dynamic behavior of a mixed duopoly game model is studied. Based on the principle of relative profit maximization and bounded rational expectation, the corresponding discrete dynamic systems are constructed in the case of nonlinear cost function. In theory, the conditions for the local stability of Nash equilibrium are given. In terms of numerical experiments, bifurcation diagrams are used to depict the effects of product differences, adjustment speed, and other parameters on the stability of Nash equilibrium.

Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor

2020 ◽  
pp. 097674792094177
Author(s):  
Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Lifetime Employment ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
The Third ◽  
Strategic Commitment ◽  
Foreign Labour ◽  
Third Stage ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
Commitment Device

This article considers two Stackelberg games in which a state-owned firm competes against a foreign labour-managed firm. The first game is as follows. In the first stage, the state-owned firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. In the second stage, the foreign labour-managed firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment device. In the third stage, both firms simultaneously and independently choose actual outputs. The structure of the second game is nearly identical and differs only in the order in which the firms decide on the offer of lifetime employment in the first two stages. This study presents the equilibrium outcomes of these two Stackelberg games.

Strategic Commitment Under Complementary Sourcing

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yimin Wang ◽  
Rui Yin ◽  
Xiangjing Chen ◽  
Scott T. Webster
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Commitment

scholarly journals Complex Dynamical Behaviors of a Mixed Duopoly Game Based on Intellectual Property Rights Protection

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Tong Chu ◽  
Yu Yu ◽  
Xiaoxue Wang
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Fractal Structures ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights Protection ◽  
Dynamical Behaviors ◽  
Property Rights Protection ◽  
Coexistence Of Attractors

Based on the oligopoly game theory and the intellectual property rights protection policy, we investigate the complex dynamical behaviors of a mixed duopoly game with quadratic cost. In the new system, a few parameters are improved by considering intellectual property rights protection and the stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium point are discussed in detail. A set of the two-dimensional bifurcation diagrams is demonstrated by using numerical modeling, and these diagrams show abundant complex dynamical behaviors, such as coexistence of attractors, different bifurcation, and fractal structures. These dynamical properties can present the long-run effects of strengthening intellectual property protection.

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