Improved and practical proposal for measurement device independent quantum dialogue

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jyotirmoy Basak ◽  
Arpita Maitra ◽  
Subhamoy Maitra
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3&4) ◽  
pp. 0203-0232
Author(s):  
Nayana Das ◽  
Goutam Paul

Quantum conference is a process of securely exchanging messages between three or more parties, using quantum resources. A Measurement Device Independent Quantum Dialogue (MDI-QD) protocol, which is secure against information leakage, has been proposed (Quantum Information Processing 16.12 (2017): 305) in 2017, is proven to be insecure against intercept-and-resend attack strategy. We first modify this protocol and generalize this MDI-QD to a three-party quantum conference and then to a multi-party quantum conference. We also propose a protocol for quantum multi-party XOR computation. None of these three protocols proposed here use entanglement as a resource and we prove the correctness and security of our proposed protocols.


Author(s):  
Nayana Das ◽  
Goutam Paul

Quantum dialogue is a process of two-way secure and simultaneous communication using a single channel. Recently, a Measurement Device Independent Quantum Dialogue (MDI-QD) protocol has been proposed [A. Maitra, Measurement device independent quantum dialogue,Quantum Inf. Process. 16(12) (2017) 305]. To make the protocol secure against information leakage, the authors have discarded almost half of the qubits remaining after the error estimation phase. In this paper, we propose two modified versions of the MDI-QD protocol such that the number of discarded qubits is reduced to almost one-fourth of the remaining qubits after the error estimation phase. We use almost half of their discarded qubits along with their used qubits to make our protocol more efficient in qubits count. We show that both of our protocols are secure under the same adversarial model given in MDI-QD protocol.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Weilong Wang ◽  
Kiyoshi Tamaki ◽  
Marcos Curty

AbstractMeasurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side-channels from quantum communication systems. The security proofs require, however, that certain assumptions on the sources are satisfied. This includes, for instance, the requirement that there is no information leakage from the transmitters of the senders, which unfortunately is very difficult to guarantee in practice. In this paper we relax this unrealistic assumption by presenting a general formalism to prove the security of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. With this formalism, we analyze the finite-key security of two prominent MDI-QKD schemes—a symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and a four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol—and determine their robustness against information leakage from both the intensity modulator and the phase modulator of the transmitters. Our work shows that MDI-QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that the sources are sufficiently isolated. Thus, it provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security of implementations of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage.


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