Introduction: Behavioral Industrial Organization

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Grubb ◽  
Victor J. Tremblay
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Behavioral Industrial Organization

Competitive Framing

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ran Spiegler
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Behavioral Industrial Organization ◽  
Marketing Messages

I present a simple framework for modeling two-firm market competition when consumer choice is “frame-dependent,” and firms use costless “marketing messages” to influence the consumer’s frame. This framework embeds several recent models in the “behavioral industrial organization” literature. I identify a property that consumer choice may satisfy, which extends the concept of Weighted Regularity due to Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and provide a characterization of Nash equilibria under this property. I use this result to analyze the equilibrium interplay between competition and framing in a variety of applications. (JEL D43, D82, M31)

Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Tremblay ◽  
Elizabeth Schroeder ◽  
Carol Horton Tremblay
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Behavioral Industrial Organization

The New Cycle in Industrial Organization

1918 ◽  
Vol 119 (12) ◽  
pp. 229-229
Author(s):  
Mark M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization

Business-groups in Russian industries

2004 ◽  
pp. 121-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Organization ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Organization And Management ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Main Determinants ◽  
Soviet Economic System

The chapter of “Institutional Economics” textbook is devoted to the development of business-groups as a specific feature of industrial organization in the Russian economy. The main determinants of forming and functioning of business-groups such as allocation of property rights in Soviet enterprises, networks of directors and executive authorities in the Soviet economic system as well as import of new institutes and inefficient state enforcement are in the center of analysis. Origins, structure, organization and management within the groups and the role of shareholding and informal control rights are considered.

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