Robot Scheduling for Assistance and Guidance in Hospitals

At present, the global COVID-19 epidemic has not slowed down. To reduce the contact between people during the epidemic and prevent the epidemic from expanding, we have developed a robot to assist medical staff in patient guidance and communication services. The robot can provide an emergency contact so that users can immediately contact the counter for help. The user does not have face-face contact with the medical staff. When the robot encounters obstacles in the path of travel, the detected event and the time of occurrence are sent back to the back-end system. It also provides security personnel with real-time images and robot control rights to understand the situation and deal with it in real-time.

Bankrupt Innovative Firms

We study how innovative firms manage their innovation portfolios after filing for Chapter 11 reorganization using three decades of data. We find that they sell off core (i.e., technologically critical and valuable), rather than peripheral, patents in bankruptcy. The selling pattern is driven almost entirely by firms with greater use of secured debt, and the mechanism is secured creditors exercising their control rights on collateralized patents. Creditor-driven patent sales in bankruptcy have implications for technology diffusion—the sold patents diffuse more slowly under new ownership and are more likely to be purchased by patent trolls. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Does the preference of family board seats allocation influence corporate investment efficiency?

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the influence of over-allocation and under-allocation of family board seats on the corporate investment efficiency. Design/methodology/approach Based on the perspective of altruistic behavior, this paper theoretically analyzes the relationship between the preference of family board seats allocation and corporate investment efficiency, and designs the research. On this basis, we use STATA14.0 as an analysis tool to empirically test the relationship between the preference of family family board seats allocation and corporate investment efficiency, and consider the impact of different governance scenarios. Findings This study finds that firms with a higher over-allocation degree of family board seats invest more efficiently, evidenced by significantly suppressed over-investment rather than mitigated under-investment. However, we do not find evidence that the higher degree of under-allocation of family board seats contribute to lower corporate investment efficiency. Additionally, this study finds that the positive relationship between the over-allocation degree of family board seats and corporate investment efficiency is more pronounced for firms with higher separation of cash flow rights and control rights, and weaker regional law system environment. Our mechanism discussion shows that the higher over-allocation level of family board seats contributes to the mitigation of agency costs for family firms by reducing the tendency for non-family boards to vote “against board proposals” and the appropriation behavior of the controlling family, and eventually improving corporate investment efficiency. Originality/value This paper examines the relationship between the preference of family board seats allocation and corporate investment efficiency from the perspective of altruistic behavior. Unlike previous studies, this paper distinguishes the governance effects arising from over-allocation and under-allocation of family board seats. Additionally, different governance scenarios are incorporated into the decision-making mechanism of the board of family firms, and the influences of the divergence of cash-flow and control rights and a weaker regional law system on the governance effect of the preference of family board seat allocation are analyzed.

POLITICAL CONNECTION, FAMILY OWNERSHIP, AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN MANUFACTURING COMPANIES IN INDONESIA

Political connections have an essential role in the earnings management strategy. Political connections can influence earnings management practices. The research aimed to analyze the effect of politics and family ownership on earnings management practices. The sample is 92 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2016-2019. Methods of data using a purposive sampling method. Multiple linear regression is an analytical tool used to test the hypothesis. The results show that political connections influence profits. The company pays more attention to the company’s reputation and maintains the privileges of the political relationship that has existed between the company and the government. Family ownership affects earnings management. Family ownership has control rights that can be used to influence management in company profits. The novelty of this research is that political connections can influence earnings management.

Venture capital, control rights, and family enterprise growth

This research explores and explains the path of family enterprise venture capital equity financing from the perspective of endogenous family control rights. We adopted unbalanced panel data on Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2018. Empirical research shows that there are significant differences in the impact of venture capital on the growth performance of family enterprises and non-family enterprises. Venture capital negatively affects the growth performance of family enterprises, while the negative impact of venture capital on family enterprises is not significant. In addition, family control positively moderates the negative impact of venture capital on family enterprise growth performance.