Realism, inferential semantics, and the truth norm

It is disputed what norm, if any, governs assertion. We address this question by looking at assertions of future contingents: statements about the future that are neither metaphysically necessary nor metaphysically impossible. Many philosophers think that future contingents are not truth apt, which together with a Truth Norm or a Knowledge Norm of assertion implies that assertions of these future contingents are systematically infelicitous.In this article, we argue that our practice of asserting future contingents is incompatible with the view that they are not truth apt. We consider a range of norms of assertion and argue that the best explanation of the data is provided by the view that assertion is governed by the Knowledge Norm.

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Duality and Inferential Semantics

Axiomathes ◽

10.1007/s10516-014-9263-6 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 25 (4) ◽

pp. 495-513 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

James Trafford

Keyword(s):

Inferential Semantics

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Formal truth and objective reference in an inferentialist setting

Pragmatics & Cognition ◽

10.1075/pc.13.1.04ste ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 13 (1) ◽

pp. 7-37

Author(s):

Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer

Keyword(s):

Pragmatic Theory ◽

Theory Of Meaning ◽

Original Idea ◽

Normative Pragmatics ◽

Objective Reference ◽

Inferential Semantics ◽

Social Behaviorism

The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-representationalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theories (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), conventionalism (D. Lewis), justificational theories (Dummett, Lorenzen) and, finally, Brandom’s normative pragmatics.

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Friendship versus the Normativity of Truth

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly ◽

10.5840/acpq2019522184 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 93 (3) ◽

pp. 527-549

Author(s):

Joseph Gamache ◽

Keyword(s):

Potential Problem ◽

Philosophical Tradition ◽

Gabriel Marcel ◽

False Dilemma ◽

Truth Norm ◽

Universal Truth ◽

Truth Value

According to some contemporary epistemologists, truth is a norm of belief: for any proposition p, one ought to believe that p only if p is true. It is sometimes also held that the evaluation of beliefs in terms of their truth-value is universal: truth is a norm of all, and not merely some, of one’s beliefs. Taken together, these claims have inspired the “friendship objection” to the truth-norm. According to this objection, friendship sometimes requires that friends violate the truth-norm when it comes to their beliefs about each other. I begin by discussing how the friendship objection poses a potential problem for the Catholic philosophical tradition. Then, I attempt to resolve the objection by arguing that it is committed to a false dilemma about friendship. Drawing on insights of Gabriel Marcel and Dietrich von Hildebrand, I sketch a virtue by which friends negotiate the demands of both friendship and truth.

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From Speech Acts to Semantics

Studies in Logic Grammar and Rhetoric ◽

10.2478/slgr-2014-0006 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 36 (1) ◽

pp. 121-142 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jim Mackenzie

Keyword(s):

Speech Acts ◽

Dialogue Theory ◽

Formal Dialogue ◽

Inferential Semantics

Abstract Frege introduced the notion of pragmatic force as what distinguishes statements from questions. This distinction was elaborated by Wittgenstein in his later works, and systematised as an account of different kinds of speech acts in formal dialogue theory by Hamblin. It lies at the heart of the inferential semantics more recently developed by Brandom. The present paper attempts to sketch some of the relations between these developments.

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