Intellectual Flourishing, The Truth Norm, and Epistemic Norm Pluralism

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-83
Author(s):  
Jill Cumby ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Truth Norm

The Epistemic Norms of Action

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Epistemological Principle ◽  
Knowledge Norms

Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.

scholarly journals A puzzle about enkratic reasoning

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Way
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Epistemic Position ◽  
Good Reasoning

Abstract Enkratic reasoning—reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing—seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know.

An Epistemic Norm for Implicature

2017 ◽  
Vol 114 (7) ◽  
pp. 381-391
Author(s):  
Adam Green ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norm

Assertion and the Future

2019 ◽  
pp. 479-504
Author(s):  
Corine Besson ◽  
Anandi Hattiangadi
Keyword(s):  
Future Contingents ◽  
Norms Of Assertion ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
The Future ◽  
Truth Norm

It is disputed what norm, if any, governs assertion. We address this question by looking at assertions of future contingents: statements about the future that are neither metaphysically necessary nor metaphysically impossible. Many philosophers think that future contingents are not truth apt, which together with a Truth Norm or a Knowledge Norm of assertion implies that assertions of these future contingents are systematically infelicitous.In this article, we argue that our practice of asserting future contingents is incompatible with the view that they are not truth apt. We consider a range of norms of assertion and argue that the best explanation of the data is provided by the view that assertion is governed by the Knowledge Norm.

Bias

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Antony
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Helen Longino ◽  
Social Prejudice ◽  
Underdetermination Of Theory

This chapter offers an account of central issues and themes in feminist philosophical reflections on bias and objectivity. Some feminists have argued that objectivity is an unachievable and thus inappropriate epistemic norm for human beings. But at the same time, these feminists have criticized philosophy for displaying masculinist bias. This complex critique faces a problem I’ve called the “Bias Paradox” and that Helen Longino calls an “Essential Tension:” how we can criticize partiality at the same time we acknowledge its ubiquity. I explain Longino’s proposed “social empiricist” solution, and contrast it with my own. I argue for a re-conception of “bias” as a normatively neutral epistemic inclination. Biases, in this sense, play a crucial constructive role in the development of human knowledge by solving the problem of underdetermination of theory by evidence. The biases we (correctly) regard as morally bad, such as social prejudice, involve the operation of neutral biases in unpropitious natural or social environments.

Epistemic norm correspondence and the belief–assertion parallel

Analysis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-265
Author(s):  
Mona Simion
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norm

No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Conscious Belief

Abstract Many agree that one cannot consciously form a belief just because one wants to. And many also agree this is a puzzling component of our conscious belief-forming processes. I will look at three views on how to make sense of this puzzle and show that they all fail in some way. I then offer a simpler explanation that avoids all the pitfalls of those views, which is based instead on an analysis of our conscious reasoning combined with a commonly accepted account of the concept of belief. I conclude that no epistemic norm or aim is actually needed to explain why we cannot deliberatively believe whatever we want.

scholarly journals Intersubjective Accountability: Politics and Philosophy in the Left Vienna Circle

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-62
Author(s):  
Thomas Uebel
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Economic Change ◽  
Vienna Circle ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Norm ◽  
Political Movements ◽  
Rudolf Carnap ◽  
National Economies

In different places Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath affirmed “a noteworthy agreement” and an “inner link” between their philosophy of science and political movements agitating for radical socio-economic change. Given the normative abstinence of Vienna Circle philosophy, indeed the metaethical commitments of its verificationism, this claim presents a major interpretive challenge that is only heightened when Neurath’s engagement for the socialization of national economies is taken into account. It is argued here that Carnap’s and Neurath’s positions are saved from inconsistency once some careful distinctions are understood and it is recognized that they, together with the other members of the Circle, adhered to an epistemic norm here called “intersubjective accountability.”

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document