This chapter examines contemporary debates about statism and globalism. Statists need a necessary condition for justice to apply. They must tell us what it is about states that renders such principles applicable, and does so only in states. The quest for such a condition ends inconclusively. This result leads to a pluralist view of the grounds of justice. To use a distinction from the philosophy of science, the debate among versions of statism turns out to be a context of discovery for internationalism as a contender for a plausible theory of global justice. The chapter proceeds by discussing the most prominent version of globalism, the view defended by Charles Beitz, who argues that John Rawls' principles hold globally. To engage with Beitz, the chapter considers the merits of relationism and then suggests that Rawls' principles do not apply to the global order.
Abduction − the context of discovery + underdetermination = inference to the best explanation
